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Dodging Public Nuisance 
Albert C. Lin* 
Public nuisance claims against fossil fuel companies, drug companies, lead paint 
manufacturers, and other industries have raised the specter of onerous abatement orders and 
damage awards. While courts sometimes have rejected these industry-oriented public nuisance 
claims on their substantive merits, in climate change cases federal district courts have turned 
to doctrines of avoidance—including jurisdictional defenses and justiciability doctrines—to 
dismiss cases and avoid reaching the substantive merits. This dodging of public nuisance, often 
supported by questionable legal analysis, not only undermines the functions of tort law, but 
also cuts short important discussions between the judiciary, the political branches, and the 
broader public. Although plaintiffs ultimately may not succeed, courts should fulfill their 
responsibility to address public nuisance claims on their substantive merits, rather than 
reflexively relying on avoidance doctrines to dodge such claims. 
  
 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law. Thanks to participants at the 2019 
Northwestern University School of Law Fourth Annual Research Roundtable on Animal Law and 
Regulation: Nuisance as a Regulatory Tool for helpful suggestions. Thanks also to Dean Kevin Johnson, 
Associate Dean Afra Afsharipour, the U.C. Davis School of Law, and the U.C. Davis Small Grant in 
Aid of Research program for supporting this project, and to Ashley Bateman for her research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public nuisance claims against fossil fuel companies, drug companies, lead 
paint manufacturers, and other industries have raised the specter of onerous 
abatement orders and damage awards. Such potential liability, for conduct 
sometimes dating back decades, has prompted some to call for curbs on public 
nuisance actions. Perhaps in response to these calls, courts in some instances have 
rejected public nuisance claims on their substantive merits. In other instances, 
courts have turned to doctrines of avoidance—including jurisdictional defenses and 
justiciability doctrines—to dismiss cases and avoid reaching the substantive merits 
of public nuisance claims. Such avoidance by federal district courts has been 
especially common—and questionable—in climate change cases.1 This Article takes 
a closer look at the legal reasoning in this subset of cases and concludes that it would 
often be appropriate for courts to address public nuisance claims on the merits, 
rather than warping the doctrines underlying these preliminary defenses. The failure 
to engage the substance of these claims not only undermines the functions of tort 
law, but also cuts short important discussions between the judiciary, the political 
branches, and the broader public. 
Public interest public nuisance litigation, referring to public nuisance actions 
aimed at broad social problems, has been the subject of substantial academic 
commentary.2 Some literature focuses on claims aimed at specific problems such as 
climate change,3 whereas other literature considers public interest public nuisance 
more generally.4 Against this background, this Article first catalogues trial courts’ 
systematic avoidance of the substantive merits of public nuisance in climate change 
cases. As Part I demonstrates, courts’ treatment of these cases stands in sharp 
contrast to courts’ treatment of public interest litigation not involving climate 
change, where courts have frequently engaged with the substantive merits of public 
nuisance claims. Part II closely examines district courts’ use of avoidance doctrines 
and finds that their analyses are often problematic. In many instances, the courts 
have stretched avoidance doctrines, disregarding existing precedent and the 
 
1. While this Article focuses on courts’ dodging of the merits of public nuisance claims, trial 
courts have similarly dodged the merits of public trust claims involving climate change. See Katrina 
Fischer Kuh, The Legitimacy of Judicial Climate Engagement, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731, 734–44 (2020);  
cf. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020) (dismissing public trust claims against 
federal government for lack of standing). 
2. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating 
Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S.C. L. REV. 201 (2010) [hereinafter Gifford, Climate Change ]; Donald 
G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741 (2003) [hereinafter 
Gifford, Public Nuisance ]; DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT 
INDUSTRIES: GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION (2010); Kuh, supra note 
1; Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENV’T L. 1 (2011); Victor  
E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a 
Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (2006); Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71  
VAND. L. REV. 1227 (2018). 
3. See, e.g., Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2; Kysar, supra note 2. 
4. See, e.g., Gifford, Public Nuisance, supra note 2. 
First to Printer_Lin.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/29/20  11:27 AM 
492 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:489 
rationales underlying the doctrines. Finally, Part III explores the broader 
ramifications of these developments for the avoidance doctrines, the rule of law, 
and society’s response to climate change. Courts should not reflexively rely on 
avoidance doctrines to dodge climate change public nuisance claims. 
I. PUBLIC INTEREST PUBLIC NUISANCE LITIGATION 
After presenting a brief explanation of public interest public nuisance 
litigation, this Part examines district courts’ disposition of public interest public 
nuisance cases in different subject areas. In the climate change cases, in contrast to 
other cases, district courts have consistently avoided engaging with the substance of 
public nuisance claims. 
A. Definitions 
1. Public Nuisance 
Public nuisance is often defined as a substantial and unreasonable interference 
with a public right where the defendant has control of the instrumentality causing 
the interference.5 At common law, public rights subject to public nuisance included 
rights to unobstructed highways and waterways, as well as rights to unpolluted air 
and water.6 While courts have found public nuisances under a wide range of 
circumstances, environmental problems—such as dust, smoke, chemical exposure, 
and odors—are among the most recognizable public nuisances.7 In perhaps the 
most prominent public nuisance case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., the Supreme 
Court found a public nuisance where sulfur dioxide emissions from Tennessee 
smelters caused significant damage to crops and vegetation in the neighboring state 
of Georgia.8 Public nuisance plaintiffs are typically public authorities, but private 
parties who have suffered a special injury—an injury different in kind from the 
public’s general injury—can assert public nuisance claims as well.9  
The precise elements of public nuisance vary by jurisdiction. Offering a broad 
approach, California statutorily defines a nuisance as  
[a]nything which is injurious to health, . . . or is indecent or offensive to 
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs 
 
5. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1334 (1st ed. 2000). 
6. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I. 2008) (describing public right); see also 
DOBBS, supra note 5, at 1335; Gifford, Public Nuisance, supra note 2, at 815 (describing fact patterns 
constituting public nuisance under common law). 
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1979); W. PAGE 
KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 90, at 643–44 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); Denise E. Antolini & Clifford  
L. Rechtschaffen, Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, 38 ENV’T L. REP. 10114, 10120–21 (2008). 
8. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238–39 (1907). 
9. See Albert C. Lin, Deciphering the Chemical Soup: Using Public Nuisance to Compel Chemical 
Testing, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 975 (2010). 
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the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or 
river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or 
highway . . . .10 
California law goes on to define a public nuisance as a nuisance that “affects 
at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number 
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon 
individuals may be unequal.”11 Unlike in some other jurisdictions, “liability for 
nuisance [in California] does not hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses 
or controls the property, nor on whether he is in a position to abate the nuisance; 
the critical question is whether the defendant created or assisted in the creation of 
the nuisance.”12 While production of a defective product alone does not constitute 
a nuisance,13 a product manufacturer’s more egregious conduct—such as 
promotion of a product “with knowledge of the hazard that such use would 
create”—may suffice.14 
The wide range of circumstances in which courts have found a public nuisance 
has prompted the criticism that public nuisance lacks “meaningful definition and 
discernable boundaries.”15 Indeed, a leading treatise once declared, “There is 
perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds 
the word ‘nuisance.’”16 Whatever the scope of the doctrine, public nuisance 
nonetheless remains an important mechanism for protecting public rights. 
2. Public Interest Public Nuisance 
Public nuisance claims inherently have a public aspect to them, as public 
nuisance requires interference with a public right or harm to large numbers of 
people.17 Nonetheless, one can distinguish between relatively simple factual 
situations, where a defendant’s conduct directly interferes with the rights of a 
community—as in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper—from more complex situations 
 
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (2020), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection. 
xhtml?sectionNum=3479.&lawCode=CIV [https://perma.cc/2VHC-TY6R]. 
11. Id. § 3480.  
12. County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(quoting City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 872  
(Ct. App. 2004)). 
13. See id. at 328. 
14. Id.; see also id. (“A public nuisance cause of action is not premised on a defect in a product 
or a failure to warn but on affirmative conduct that assisted in the creation of a hazardous condition.”).  
15. Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass Products 
Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 926 (2005); see also Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 2 (arguing 
that products liability law, and not public nuisance doctrine, should govern liability relating to the 
manufacturing of products). 
16. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 90, at 643.  
17. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES  
P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 80 (8th ed. 2018). In those 
jurisdictions requiring interference with a public right, and not merely interference with the individual 
rights of a large number of persons, the public right refers to a collective right that is common to all 
members of the general public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1979). 
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where the interference is more indirect and mediated by the actions of additional 
parties. Often, these more complex cases—such as climate change—involve 
especially widespread harms affecting thousands or millions of people.18 Donald 
Gifford uses the term “public interest tort litigation” to describe these collective 
common law actions that “seek[ ] to tackle large social problems instead of seeking 
to resolve disputes between individual parties.”19  
Noting that such litigation is often filed in response to a perceived failure of 
the political branches, Gifford offers tobacco, handgun, lead pigment, and climate 
change litigation as examples of this public law model of tort litigation.20 This 
model, Gifford contends, is “the wrong tool for the job of addressing climate 
change” and other social problems.21 Instead, he urges judges to “use the traditional 
doctrines of judicial restraint to reject the invitation to engage in faux legislation.”22 
But while judicial solutions to these problems are less than ideal, judicial restraint 
has its own costs, as significant social harms are swept under the rug and persons 
harmed are left without avenues for seeking redress. Moreover, contrary to concerns 
regarding countermajoritarian decisions by the courts, judicial review can play a 
critical role in upholding democratic values.23  
B. Public Interest Public Nuisance Cases Other than Climate Change 
As Gifford observes, courts have dismissed public interest public  
nuisance cases  
because of plaintiffs’ inability to satisfy the substantive requirements 
of . . . public nuisance; the conflict between the common law actions and 
legislative enactments already in place; or the fact that any harm sustained 
by the states or municipalities was too “remote” from the manufacturers’ 
conduct or too “derivative” to justify liability.24  
Indeed, in cases not involving climate change, courts have often engaged 
directly in the substantive application of public nuisance law. Although plaintiffs 
sometimes failed to achieve their litigation objectives, the courts have not shied 
away from deciding, based on the pleadings or evidence, whether plaintiffs had 
alleged or proven public nuisance. Courts’ engagement with the substantive merits 
of public nuisance in these cases suggests that courts are capable of evaluating public 
nuisance claims in climate change cases as well, notwithstanding their  
factual complexity. 
 
18. Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 219. 
19. Id.  
20. Id. at 219–20.  
21. Id. at 204; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L., no. 2, 2011, 
at 5–6 (proposing a requirement, based on public nuisance’s historical roots as a public action rather 
than a tort, that “the legislature . . . speak before courts use public nuisance law to adjudicate lawsuits 
targeting controversial social harm[ ]”). 
22. Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 204. 
23. See infra Section III.C. 
24. Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 206. 
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What follows is a brief survey of public interest public nuisance cases involving 
harms other than climate change. Many of these cases involve environmental 
hazards: school districts and municipalities sued asbestos product manufacturers in 
the 1980s to recover the costs of asbestos removal; state and local governments 
subsequently sued lead paint manufacturers to pay for lead paint abatement; and 
local governments are now suing the sole manufacturer of PCBs to address 
widespread PCB contamination in the environment. In nonenvironmental contexts, 
public nuisance suits have been brought against tobacco companies to recover the 
costs of treating tobacco-related diseases, gun manufacturers to impose 
responsibility for gun violence, and opioid manufacturers to seek abatement and 
other relief from the ongoing opioid epidemic. 
1. Asbestos Litigation 
Lawsuits against asbestos product manufacturers represent some of the first 
efforts to apply nuisance doctrine to mass-manufactured products.25 These efforts 
were unsuccessful, as courts repeatedly expressed the concern that plaintiffs were 
seeking to bring a products liability action disguised as a nuisance claim.26 Most 
courts rejected plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims on the specific ground that 
defendants lacked control of the instrumentality alleged to constitute a nuisance.27 
For example, in City of Manchester v. National Gypsum Co., the court explained that 
“a basic element of the tort of nuisance is absent,” as “[t]he instrumentality which 
created the nuisance . . . has been in the possession and control of the 
plaintiff . . . since the time it purchased the products containing asbestos 
materials.”28 Similarly, the court of appeals in Detroit Board of Education v. Celotex 
explained that because “Defendants gave up ownership and control of their 
products when the products were sold to plaintiffs[,] Defendants now lack the legal 
right to abate whatever hazards their products may pose.”29 It is worth noting that 
although courts dismissed asbestos plaintiffs’ nuisance claims, they rejected those 
claims on the merits.30  
 
25.  In many of these cases, plaintiffs asserted public and private nuisance claims or a general 
nuisance claim without distinguishing the two. See, e.g., City of Manchester v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 637 
F. Supp. 646, 656 (D.R.I. 1986) (pleading both public and private nuisance); Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 
15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 920 (8th Cir. 1993) (pleading nuisance). Gifford, Public Nuisance, 
supra note 2, at 751. 
26. See Gifford, Public Nuisance, supra note 2, at 751–52; e.g., City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum 
Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876, 883–84 (Ct. App. 1994); Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 
513, 521 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
27. Tioga, 984 F.2d at 920 (discussing cases). 
28. 637 F. Supp. at 656. 
29. 493 N.W.2d at 522. 
30. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. at 656; Detroit Bd. of Educ., 493 N.W.2d at 522. 
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2. Lead Paint Litigation 
During the early 2000s, various local governments and the state of Rhode 
Island brought public nuisance actions to require lead paint manufacturers to abate 
hazards caused by deteriorating lead paint in homes and other buildings. With the 
exception of litigation filed in California, these efforts ultimately failed. Even where 
plaintiffs were unsuccessful, however, the courts generally addressed the substance 
of their claims rather than dismissing the cases for procedural reasons or on grounds 
of judicial restraint. 
The Rhode Island litigation produced the first U.S. trial verdict to impose 
public nuisance liability on lead paint manufacturers.31 However, the verdict was 
overturned by the state supreme court, which held that the state had not and could 
not allege any set of facts to support its public nuisance claim.32 Specifically, the 
state could not establish that the lead paint manufacturers interfered with a public 
right or that they were in control of the nuisance-causing instrumentality.33 “Public 
right,” the court explained, traditionally refers to “those indivisible resources shared 
by the public at large, such as air, water, or public rights of way” and does not 
include “[t]he right of an individual child not to be poisoned by lead paint.”34 In 
addition, the state had failed to allege that the defendants had control over the lead 
pigment at the time that it harmed the children of Rhode Island.35  
Lead paint litigation in New Jersey failed on similar grounds. The City of 
Newark and twenty-five other local jurisdictions had sued paint manufacturers to 
recover the costs of abating lead paint in homes and buildings and providing 
associated medical care.36 The cases were consolidated, and the New Jersey Supreme 
Court eventually held that the plaintiffs could not state a cognizable claim within 
the traditional parameters of common law public nuisance.37 Poor maintenance by 
the property owners—and not the defendants’ conduct—had caused the harm, the 
court explained.38 In support of this conclusion, the court noted that a state statute 
directed local boards of health to abate lead paint and imposed liability on property 
owners for abatement costs.39 Additionally, the court found that the damages 
sought by the plaintiffs were unavailable as a remedy to public entities filing public 
nuisance actions.40  
Claims in several other states were also rejected for failing to establish one or 
more elements of public nuisance. For example, St. Louis’s efforts to recover the 
costs of its lead abatement program failed because the city could not causally link 
 
31. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 434 (R.I. 2008). 
32. Id. at 435. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 453–54. 
35. Id. at 455. 
36. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007). 
37. Id. at 501. 
38. Id. 
39. Id.  
40. Id. at 502. 
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any specific defendant to any specific abatement project.41 Milwaukee’s lawsuit 
against a single paint manufacturer failed for lack of credible evidence that the 
defendant intentionally or knowingly created a nuisance.42 And Chicago’s public 
nuisance suit against lead paint manufacturers faltered on the issue of proximate 
cause, as the city had not identified any specific defendant as the source of lead 
paint at any particular location and the state legislature had chosen to hold 
landowners responsible for remediating lead paint.43  
Public nuisance claims for lead paint contamination have succeeded only in 
California, where, as noted above, public nuisance does not require that a defendant 
control the instrumentality creating the nuisance at the time the harm occurs. “The 
critical question,” courts have held, “is whether the defendant created or assisted in 
the creation of the nuisance.”44 In a crucial pretrial ruling, the court of appeal in 
County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. distinguished public nuisance from a 
product liability claim.45 “Liability is premised on defendants’ promotion of lead 
paint for interior use with knowledge of the hazard that such use would create,” the 
court emphasized, not on the mere production of a hazardous product.46 After a 
bench trial, the trial court found that the defendants promoted lead paint with 
constructive, if not actual, knowledge that using lead paint would create a hazard 
and held the defendants jointly and severally liable for creating a public nuisance.47 
The $1.15 billion judgment was largely upheld on appeal.48  
3. PCBs 
In the last five years, local governments have filed nearly twenty public 
nuisance lawsuits aimed at environmental contamination involving polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs), a family of chemicals once widely used in electrical transformers, 
paints, and other products.49 The defendant in these cases, Monsanto, was the sole 
manufacturer of PCBs, which were banned in the 1970s but continue to escape into 
the environment.50 Monsanto has raised a number of arguments for dismissal, 
 
41. City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 115–16 (Mo. 2007).  
42. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d 757, 768–70 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008), review denied, 
765 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. 2009).  
43. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 134, 139–40 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal 
denied, 833 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2005); see also Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 878  
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (rejecting public nuisance claim because plaintiffs had failed to identify defendant 
that supplied the lead paint in question).  
44. County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Ct. App. 2006). 
45. Id. at 328. 
46. Id. 
47. People v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 100CV788657, 2014 WL 1385823, at *8–10, *52  
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014), rev’d sub nom. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
499 (Ct. App. 2017).  
48. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 551–52. 
49. See Jef Feeley & Tim Loh, Roundup Not Only Monsanto Legal Woe for Bayer; PCB Claims 
Still Coming, INS. J. ( July 24, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/07/24/
533721.htm [https://perma.cc/C9UP-YAQE].  
50. See id. 
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including standing, statute of limitations, failure to state a claim, failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies, and overlap with product liability law.51 So far, trial courts 
largely have rejected these arguments and declined Monsanto’s invitation to dodge 
the substance of the public nuisance claims.52 With several of the cases scheduled 
for trial, Monsanto recently submitted for court approval a $650 million proposed 
settlement to resolve PCB pollution claims by a class of local governments.53 
4. Tobacco 
Some of the best-known public nuisance claims against product manufacturers 
center on harms other than environmental contamination. Public nuisance was 
among the primary legal theories that states asserted in litigation against 
manufacturers of tobacco products in the 1990s.54 The exact role of public nuisance 
in bringing about the resulting $246 billion settlements is unclear, however, as the 
courts never issued a ruling on the merits of the public nuisance claims.55 
Subsequent cases brought by individuals, health insurers, or other parties 
against tobacco companies sometimes asserted public nuisance claims.56 However, 
many of these later cases were dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. Often, 
courts held that hospitals’ or insurers’ allegations that they bore additional costs as 
a result of smokers’ injuries were insufficient to establish proximate causation.57 In 
 
51. City of San Diego v. Monsanto Co., 310 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1060 n.2, 1063–64  
(S.D. Cal. 2018); City of Spokane v. Monsanto Co., No. 2:15-CV-00201-SMJ, 2016 WL 6275164, at *3, 
*7 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2016); City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1104–06  
(W.D. Wash. 2017); Port of Portland v. Monsanto Co., No. 3:17–CV–15–PK, 2017 WL 9098079, at 
*14–17 (D. Or. Apr. 18, 2017). 
52. Monsanto Co., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 1060 n.2, 1063–64 (rejecting defendant’s arguments with 
respect to standing, statute of limitations, failure to state a claim, and failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Monsanto Co., No. 15-cv-578-WQH-AGS, 2020 WL 
1479071, at *11–12, *14–16 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020) (rejecting standing, displacement, and ripeness 
arguments); Monsanto Co., 2016 WL 6275164, at *3, *7 (rejecting statute of limitations and standing 
arguments); Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1104–06 (rejecting statute of limitations and standing 
arguments); Monsanto Co., 2017 WL 9098079, at *14–17 (rejecting standing, statute of limitations, and 
overlap with product liability law arguments); City of Chula Vista v. Monsanto Co.,  
No. 18cv1942-WQH-AGS, 2019 WL 1317330, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2019) (rejecting exhaustion 
argument); City of Long Beach v. Monsanto Co., No. CV 16-3493 FMO (ASx), 2018 WL 4846657, at 
*4–5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2018) (rejecting exhaustion argument); City of Portland v. Monsanto Co.,  
No. 3:16-cv-01418-PK, 2017 WL 4236583, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2017) (rejecting standing argument); 
San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Monsanto Co., No. 15-cv-578-WQH-JLB, 2016 WL 5464551, at *6 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2016) (rejecting standing argument). But cf. City of San Jose v. Monsanto Co.,  
No. 5:15-cv-03178-EJD, 2017 WL 3335735, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2017) (granting motion to stay 
pending exhaustion of administrative remedies).  
53. See Feeley & Loh, supra note 49; Gene Johnson, Monsanto to Pay $95M over PCB Pollution 
in Washington State, AP ( June 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/651ded32cc6bf210e78695ac7892d473 
[https://perma.cc/R22W-UKXE] (noting also the separate $170 million proposed settlement to 
resolve PCB pollution claims by Washington state, New Mexico, and Washington, D.C.). 
54. See Gifford, Public Nuisance, supra note 2, at 753. 
55. See id. at 754, 761–64. 
56. See id. at 763 n.113. 
57. See, e.g., E. States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 240, 247–50 
(Sup. Ct. 2000) (finding “no direct link between the alleged misconduct of Defendants and the alleged 
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other cases, courts held that plaintiffs had failed to allege special injury58 or other 
elements of public nuisance.59 Although the results of these cases were unfavorable 
to the plaintiffs, the courts—as in other public interest public nuisance  
cases—applied the substantive requirements of public nuisance law rather than 
ducking the issue altogether.  
5. Guns 
Drawing inspiration from the tobacco litigation, various states and 
municipalities filed public nuisance actions to hold gun manufacturers liable for gun 
violence during the early 2000s.60 A few of these cases were dismissed for lack of 
standing,61 but most were dismissed on the pleadings or upon summary judgment 
for failure to state an actionable public nuisance claim.62 Courts rejected plaintiffs’ 
claims for various reasons—insufficient allegations or proof of proximate 
 
damage to the Funds” because plaintiffs’ economic harm rested on injury to smokers); Ass’n of  
Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1229 (W.D. Wash. 1999), aff’d, 241 
F.3d 696, 707 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants’ actions caused 
public hospitals to bear unreimbursed costs were insufficient to demonstrate proximate cause). 
58. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, 228 F.3d 429, 446 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming district 
court finding that “[h]ospitals did not sufficiently allege that they suffered a harm different from and 
of greater magnitude than the harm suffered by the general public”).  
59. Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 972–73 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (dismissing case 
because state failed to plead elements required to establish a public nuisance—i.e., that defendants 
improperly used their own property or that state was injured in use and employment of its property). 
60. See Gifford, Public Nuisance, supra note 2, at 764–65. 
61. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 132 (Conn. 2001) (holding that 
alleged harms were “too remote . . . to confer standing” even though plaintiffs’ allegations fell within 
definition of public nuisance). 
62. See Gifford, Public Nuisance, supra note 2, at 766–69 (discussing cases). 
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causation,63 control of the instrumentality,64 or interference with a public right.65 In 
many of these decisions, courts found public nuisance inapplicable after extensively 
analyzing whether the elements of public nuisance were satisfied by the specific 
factual context of handgun violence.66 Moreover, one court, after a six-week trial, 
penned a hundred-page opinion finding that “defendants are responsible for the 
creation of a public nuisance and could . . . substantially reduce the harm 
occasioned by the diversion of guns to the illegal market and by the criminal 
possession and use of those guns.”67 The court individually considered the elements 
of public nuisance and concluded that “a public nuisance exists . . . in the form of 
widespread access to illegal firearms that causes harm to the population at large in 
that it endangers and injures the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable 
number of persons” and that “the nuisance was caused, contributed to and 
maintained by defendants.”68 Although the court ultimately dismissed the case on 
account of the plaintiff’s failure to establish a special injury, the opinion further 
illustrates how courts have not hesitated to grapple with the substance of public 
interest public nuisance claims.69 
6. Opioids 
Ongoing public nuisance lawsuits against opioid manufacturers and 
distributors bear some resemblance to earlier tobacco litigation. In contrast to the 
tobacco cases, however, the courts in the opioid cases have begun to rule on the 
merits of plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims. Most of the federal cases filed by local 
 
63. See, e.g., In re Firearm Cases, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659, 682 (Ct. App. 2005) (affirming grant of 
summary judgment to defendants “for lack of any evidence of causation”); Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 
N.E.2d 1078, 1091 (Ill. 2004) (holding that “the defendants’ conduct is not a legal cause of the alleged 
nuisance because the claimed harm is the aggregate result of numerous unforeseeable intervening 
criminal acts by third parties”); District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 650 (D.C.) 
(declining to “relax the common-law limitations of duty, foreseeability, and direct causation so as to 
recognize the broad claim of public nuisance”), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 928 (2005); City of Chicago  
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1138 (Ill. 2004) (holding that pleadings were insufficient to 
establish proximate causation); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 201–02 
(App. Div.) (holding that harm alleged “is far too remote” and that defendants’ lawful activity was not 
a proximate cause), appeal denied, 801 N.E.2d 421 (2003). 
64. See, e.g., Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 
541 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that “the County has failed to allege that the manufacturers exercise 
sufficient control over the source of the interference with the public right”); City of Philadelphia  
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 422 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “defendants lack the requisite 
control over the interference with a public right”). But cf. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 
768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio 2002) (holding that the allegation that “appellees control the creation and 
supply of this illegal, secondary market for firearms, not the actual use of the firearms that cause injury,” 
is sufficient to establish control of alleged nuisance). 
65. See, e.g., Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d at 1114–16 (finding lack of authority to expand 
public right to encompass right to be free from unreasonable threats of danger caused by presence of 
illegal weapons). 
66. See, e.g., id. at 1113–38; Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d at 646–51. 
67. NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
68. Id. at 519. 
69. Id. at 446. 
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governments to recover costs of responding to the opioid crisis have been 
consolidated in the Northern District of Ohio for purposes of resolving pretrial 
matters.70 The plaintiffs in these cases have asserted public nuisance as well as other 
claims, and notwithstanding the complexity of the issues and the potentially 
enormous damages at stake, the trial court has engaged with the substance of the 
nuisance claims.71 Defendants and plaintiff counties have reached settlements 
(pending approval) in the first of these cases, although the vast majority of cases 
remain pending.72  
In addition to the consolidated federal litigation, almost all states have filed 
separate lawsuits in state court, alleging public nuisance and other claims.73 In the 
first ruling to hold a drug company liable for the opioid epidemic, an Oklahoma 
judge ruled in August 2019 that Johnson & Johnson’s misleading promotion of 
opioids created a public nuisance.74 While the ruling is now on appeal, the trial court 
directly addressed the substance of the public nuisance claim, holding that the 
defendants’ false and misleading marketing of opioids injured the health and safety 
of a considerable number of state residents.75 
C. Climate Change Public Nuisance Decisions 
In contrast to the public interest public nuisance cases just described, the 
climate change public nuisance cases have proceeded without rulings on whether 
the plaintiffs actually proved the elements of public nuisance. In the first wave of 
cases, which centered on federal public nuisance law, district courts dodged applying 
public nuisance law to climate change by relying on justiciability doctrines of 
standing and political question as well as the doctrine of displacement. The second 
wave of cases, which are still working their way through the courts, have raised 
primarily state public nuisance claims. In two of those cases, Oakland v. BP and New 
York City v. BP, district courts dismissed public nuisance claims originally based on 
state law by recharacterizing them as federal claims and then deeming them 
displaced by federal statute or beyond the adjudicatory power of federal courts.  
 
70. See Colin Dwyer, Your Guide to the Massive (and Massively Complex) Opioid Litigation, NPR 
(Oct. 24, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/10/15/761537367/your-
guide-to-the-massive-and-massively-complex-opioid-litigation [https://perma.cc/BC47-K6F3]. 
71. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 406 F. Supp. 3d 672, 672–77 (N.D. Ohio 2019) 
(denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on public nuisance claims); In re Nat’l Prescription 
Opiate Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 773, 813–15 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (rejecting argument that economic loss 
doctrine bars recovery for common law absolute public nuisance claim). 
72. See Dwyer, supra note 70; Suggestions of Remand, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,  
No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP ( J.P.M.L. Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/sites/ohnd/
files/2941.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5Y8-XEXF] (proposing to Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation strategic remands of a select number of cases to facilitate resolution of different issues and 
types of cases). 
73. See Suggestions of Remand, supra note 72, at 3 & n.2 (noting that forty-eight states plus the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have filed eighty-nine opioid-related cases in state courts). 
74. State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 WL 4019929 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019). 
75. Id. at *10–14. 
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1. California v. GM 
In California v. GM, one of the first climate change public nuisance cases, 
California alleged that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from automobiles 
manufactured by defendants constituted a public nuisance under federal common 
law.76 Dismissing the case because it presented nonjusticiable political questions, 
the district court emphasized “the complexity of the initial global warming policy 
determinations that must be made by the elected branches prior to the proper 
adjudication of Plaintiff’s federal common law nuisance claim.”77 The court also 
noted a “textual commitment of interstate commerce and foreign policy to the 
political branches,” and “a lack of judicially discoverable or manageable 
standards.”78 California appealed, but voluntarily dismissed its appeal before the 
Ninth Circuit could review the trial court’s decision.79 
2. Comer v. Murphy Oil 
Another early case, Comer v. Murphy Oil, reflects perhaps the most convoluted 
avoidance of the merits of public nuisance in a climate change case. The plaintiff 
property owners in Comer asserted public nuisance and other common law claims 
against electric, fossil fuel, and chemical companies for allegedly exacerbating 
Hurricane Katrina’s harmful effects through their GHG emissions.80 The district 
court dismissed under the political question doctrine and for lack of standing.81 A 
Fifth Circuit panel reversed, explaining that plaintiffs’ nuisance claim did not 
present a political question exclusively committed to the legislative or executive 
branch, and that the defendants’ alleged contribution to the harm was sufficient to 
meet the causation element of standing.82 However, the panel’s opinion was vacated 
after the Fifth Circuit granted en banc review.83 Then, due to the loss of a quorum, 
the Fifth Circuit dismissed the en banc review, resulting in reinstatement of the 
district court’s opinion.84 Noting that no surviving appellate court opinion had ever 
addressed the substance of the district court’s ruling, the plaintiffs refiled the case.85 
 
76. People v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). 
77. Id. at *6. 
78. Id. at *13–16. 
79. See Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal, California ex rel. Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
No. 07-16908 (9th Cir. June 19, 2009), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2009/20090619_docket-07-16908_motion.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7MB9-HHQN]. 
80. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA (Comer I), 585 F.3d 855, 859–60 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated and reh’g 
granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010). 
81. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA (Comer II), No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855, vacated and reh’g granted, 598 F.3d 208. 
82. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 866, 869. 
83. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA (Comer III), 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010), mandamus 
denied, In re Comer (Comer IV), 562 U.S. 1133 (2011). 
84. Id. at 1053–55. 
85. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA (Comer V), 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854 (S.D. Miss. 2012). 
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The district court dismissed the refiled claims on res judicata grounds, thereby 
depriving the plaintiffs of a ruling on the substantive merits of their claims.86 
3. AEP v. Connecticut 
The most influential of the first wave of climate change public nuisance cases, 
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), likewise began with a district court 
ruling that dodged the merits.87 Seeking injunctive relief, the plaintiffs in AEP 
alleged that GHG emissions from defendants’ power plants constituted a public 
nuisance under federal common law.88 Deeming the claims nonjusticiable under the 
political question doctrine, the district court explained that resolving the plaintiffs’ 
claims “require[d] identification and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign 
policy, and national security interests, ‘an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for non-judicial discretion.’”89 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the 
political question doctrine was inapplicable and that the plaintiffs had standing.90 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ordered dismissal of the case.91 
Essentially sidestepping defendants’ arguments contesting justiciability, the 
Supreme Court held that the claims were displaced by “the [federal] Clean Air Act 
and the EPA actions it authorizes.”92 Technically, this holding constituted an 
adjudication of the case on the merits, not a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.93 
However, as a result of applying the displacement doctrine, no court in the litigation 
ever faced the question of whether climate change constitutes a public nuisance. 
Thus, through the political question and displacement doctrines, both the district 
court and Supreme Court avoided engaging with the substance of public  
nuisance law. 
4. Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. 
AEP left open the question of whether a federal public nuisance action for 
damages, as opposed to injunctive relief, remained viable. Native Village of Kivalina 
v. ExxonMobil Corp., an action for damages resulting from climate change–related 
sea level rise, squarely presented the issue. Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in 
AEP, the district court in Kivalina dismissed the case on the grounds of political 
 
86. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA (Comer VI), 718 F.3d 460, 467–69 (5th Cir. 2013), aff’g 839  
F. Supp. 2d at 855–57. 
87. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP I), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
88. Plaintiffs also alleged public nuisance claims based on state law, but these claims ultimately 
were never adjudicated. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP II), 564 U.S. 410, 429 (2011). 
89. AEP I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)). 
90. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP III), 582 F.3d 309, 321–49 (2d Cir. 2009). 
91. AEP II, 564 U.S. 410. 
92. Id. at 420 n.6, 424 (noting that four members of the Court found that no threshold obstacle 
barred review of the public nuisance claim on the merits). 
93. Id. at 420 (affirming Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction and proceeding to the merits). 
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question and standing.94 The district court held that the case presented a political 
question because there were no judicially manageable standards for balancing the 
harms and benefits of fossil fuel consumption, and because deciding the merits 
would require policy determinations limiting GHG emissions and allocating climate 
change’s costs.95 In addition, the court deemed the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries too 
remote to establish standing: the plaintiffs had demonstrated “no realistic possibility 
of tracing any particular alleged effect of global warming to any particular emissions 
by any specific person, entity, [or] group at any particular point in time.”96 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s displacement analysis from 
AEP and ordered the case dismissed. The fact that the Kivalina plaintiffs were 
seeking damages rather than an injunction, the court held, did not meaningfully 
distinguish AEP: although “the lack of a federal remedy may be a factor to be 
considered in determining whether Congress has displaced federal common 
law[,] . . . displacement of a federal common law right of action means displacement 
of remedies.”97  
5. Oakland v. BP 
As a result of AEP’s holding on displacement, plaintiffs in more recent climate 
change cases have turned to public nuisance claims based on state law. Dodging of 
the substance of these claims nevertheless has continued in some of these cases. 
The plaintiffs in Oakland v. BP alleged that five of the world’s largest oil 
companies had promoted fossil fuel use even as they knew that their products would 
contribute to dangerous global warming and associated sea level rise.98 Seeking 
abatement orders requiring the defendants to fund various adaptation measures, the 
plaintiffs filed their lawsuits in state court and initially asserted only state public 
nuisance claims.99 However, the defendants removed the cases to federal court, and 
the federal district court subsequently rejected the plaintiffs’ motion to remand the 
cases to state court on the ground that the claims—“which address the national and 
international geophysical phenomenon of global warming—are necessarily 
governed by federal common law.”100  
The plaintiffs amended their complaints to add federal public nuisance claims, 
and the defendants moved to dismiss. The court reaffirmed its earlier determination 
 
94. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1000 (2013). 
95. 663 F. Supp. 2d at 874–78. 
96. Id. at 880. 
97. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857. The Ninth Circuit did not address the political question and 
standing issues. 
98. City of Oakland v. BP PLC (BP I), 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated, 
960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020), modified, 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020). 
99. City of Oakland v. BP PLC (BP II), 969 F.3d 895, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2020). 
100. People v. BP P.L.C. (BP III), No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2  
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018), vacated sub nom. BP II, 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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that state common law was inapplicable and dismissed the federal claims.101 Citing 
AEP, the court held that the Clean Air Act (CAA) displaced the plaintiffs’ claims 
to the extent that they involved conduct and emissions arising within the United 
States.102 To the extent that the claims were premised on conduct and emissions 
outside the country, the court held that they were not displaced by statute. 
Nonetheless, the court dismissed these claims as well on the ground that 
adjudication of public nuisance in this context would “interfere[ ] with separation of 
powers and foreign policy.”103 
6. NYC v. BP 
New York City v. BP was dismissed on similar grounds. The complaint, filed 
in federal court, asserted public nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass claims and 
requested compensatory damages and abatement.104 Noting the denial of the 
motion to remand to state court in the Oakland litigation, the New York City court 
held that the plaintiffs’ claims, “based on the ‘transboundary’ emission of 
greenhouse gases,” necessarily “arise under federal common law and require a 
uniform standard of decision.”105 To the extent the claims were based on domestic 
emissions, the court held, they were displaced by the CAA.106 And to the extent the 
claims were based on foreign emissions, the court deemed the claims “barred by the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and the need for judicial caution in the face 
of ‘serious foreign policy consequences.’”107 Hinting that the case also presented 
political questions inappropriate for judicial determination, the court concluded that 
“[t]o litigate such an action for injuries from foreign greenhouse gas emissions in 
federal court would severely infringe upon the foreign-policy decisions that are 
squarely within the purview of the political branches.”108  
Other district courts, declining to follow the New York City and Oakland 
courts’ approaches, have instead remanded climate change public nuisance claims 
to state courts.109 Even in these cases, however, federal district courts have not had 
 
101. BP I, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1028. 
102. Id. at 1024. 
103. Id. at 1024–26. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling that federal question 
jurisdiction provided a basis for removal and remanded the cases to the district court to consider 
whether there was an alternative basis for subject matter jurisdiction. City of Oakland v. BP PLC (BP 
IV), 960 F.3d 570, 575 (9th Cir. 2020). 
104. The complaint does not specify whether the claims are grounded in federal or state law, 
but the pleading of diversity jurisdiction (but not subject matter jurisdiction) suggests an intent to rely 
at least in part on state law. Complaint at 13–14, 58–63, City of New York v. BP P.L.C.,  
325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No.1:18-cv-00182-JFK), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/
climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2018/20180109_docket-118- 
cv-00182_complaint-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9BU-CGFV]. 
105. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d. at 472. 
106. Id. at 472–75. 
107. Id. at 475. 
108. Id. at 476. 
109. See infra text accompanying notes 284–87. 
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to decide public nuisance claims on the merits. The overall trend remains that 
district courts avoid engaging with the substance of public nuisance claims in 
climate change cases, whether through disavowals of jurisdiction, assertions of 
nonjusticiability, or other means. Unsurprisingly, the courts have presented no 
explicit justification for consistently dodging the substance of public nuisance in 
these cases. Their opinions nonetheless suggest a discomfort with the scale of the 
problem: though the courts are not being asked to adjudicate climate change in its 
entirety, they often speak as if plaintiffs are requesting precisely that. In addition, 
the courts seem to dread the political implications of a substantive judgment for 
either side—hence, their characterization of plaintiffs’ claims as raising political 
questions or meriting judicial caution. 
II. DOCTRINES OF AVOIDANCE 
In case after case, district courts have sidestepped the question of whether 
GHG emissions and their resultant harms constitute a public nuisance. In doing so, 
these courts have relied on a variety of avoidance doctrines rooted primarily in 
separation of powers and federalism rationales. The separation-of-powers-based 
doctrines at issue include political question, standing, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, and the notion of judicial caution. The federalism-based doctrines 
courts have invoked include foreign policy preemption and other doctrines calling 
for the application of federal law to the exclusion of state law. Some district court 
opinions reflect straightforward application of governing precedent. But in many 
instances, district courts have stretched or expanded the avoidance doctrines well 
beyond existing precedent. This Part examines in detail the district courts’ use and 
misuse of avoidance doctrines in the climate change cases. 
A. Political Question 
1. Political Question in the Climate Change Cases 
Several early climate change public nuisance cases turned on the political 
question doctrine, which focuses on “the relationship between the judiciary and the 
coordinate branches of the Federal Government.”110 The “dominant 
considerations” underlying the doctrine are “the appropriateness . . . of attributing 
finality to the action of the political departments and . . . the lack of satisfactory 
criteria for a judicial determination.”111 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court set out 
six factors for determining the existence of a nonjusticiable political question.112 
The climate change public nuisance opinions have concentrated on three of those 
factors: “[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
 
110. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
111. Id. at 210. 
112. Id. at 217.  
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manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”113  
On its face, the first factor appears inapplicable to the climate change public 
nuisance cases. There is no “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department,” as the Constitution makes no 
mention of climate change or even the environment. Nonetheless, the district court 
in California v. GM asserted that “the textual commitment of interstate commerce 
and foreign policy to the political branches of government” weighed in favor of 
finding a political question.114 Specifically, the court reasoned that imposing 
damages on defendant automakers through public nuisance might infringe on 
Congress’s power to regulate national and foreign commerce.115 It might also 
infringe on foreign policy decisions by Congress or the president not to commit 
unilaterally to emissions reductions.116  
Neither of these rationales is persuasive. Supreme Court precedents applying 
public nuisance to interstate pollution make clear that Congress’s authority to 
regulate interstate commerce is not exclusive.117 As a general matter, the 
Constitution contemplates that courts will decide common law claims, and courts 
regularly impose damages on participants in commerce in the course of adjudicating 
such claims.118 Furthermore, while climate change has global implications, the 
adjudication of public nuisance claims poses little risk of interfering with foreign 
policy. A judgment against climate change defendants would impact those 
defendants, of course, but would hardly establish a national or international 
emissions policy, nor would it preclude Congress from doing so.119 Additionally, as 
the Supreme Court indicated in Massachusetts v. EPA, the possibility that a court 
ruling might reduce executive branch leverage in treaty negotiations does not 
establish courts’ lack of authority to issue such a ruling.120 
The second Baker v. Carr factor, “a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it,” was pivotal to the Kivalina district court’s 
characterization of climate change public nuisance as a political question.121 The 
court found it difficult to balance the benefits derived from fossil fuel combustion, 
the availability and impacts of alternative energy sources, and the risks of increased 
 
113. Id. at 217. The other three factors assume action by the political branches and, given the 
federal government’s relatively modest actions on the issue, are minimally relevant to the climate  
change cases.  
114. People v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755-MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *13  
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). 
115. Id. at *14. 
116. Id. 
117. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 
U.S. 496, 526 (1906). 
118. See AEP III, 582 F.3d 309, 325 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
119. See id. 
120. 549 U.S. 497, 533–34 (2007). 
121. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 874–76  
(N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1000 (2013). 
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flooding and other climate harms, and thus concluded that it could not make a 
principled and reasoned decision.122 Distinguishing precedents applying public 
nuisance in other environmental contexts, the court noted that the climate change 
plaintiffs “seek to impose liability and damages on a scale unlike any prior 
environmental pollution case.”123  
Admittedly, extensive liability and sizeable damages could result from climate 
change public nuisance litigation. This possibility does not render such cases 
judicially unmanageable, however. As the Second Circuit observed in AEP, “federal 
courts have successfully adjudicated complex common law public nuisance cases 
for over a century,” relying on common law principles and the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.124 Courts have developed various tools—including market share 
liability, substantial factor causation, and proximate causation—to address complex 
tort situations,125 have applied such tools in public interest public nuisance litigation 
involving lead paint, for example,126 and can apply these tools in climate change 
cases as well. Thus, the fact “that Plaintiffs’ injuries are part of a worldwide 
problem,” the Second Circuit explained, “does not mean Defendants’ contribution 
to that problem cannot be addressed through principled adjudication.”127  
Ultimately, whether courts can manage public nuisance in the climate change 
context may depend on how they conceptualize climate change and public nuisance. 
If one considers climate change in its entirety, the innumerable sources of GHG 
emissions, and the complex tradeoffs involved in managing the activities that 
generate those emissions, courts might reasonably throw up their hands and 
pronounce the matter judicially unmanageable. In contrast, if one focuses on the 
conduct of fossil fuel companies or other critical players and the harms suffered by 
specific plaintiffs, adjudication of these claims resembles adjudication of more 
typical environmental public nuisances. 
Indeed, the doctrine of public nuisance is open to varying interpretations that 
could prove pivotal in the climate change context. Doug Kysar has observed that 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ articulation of public nuisance “focus[es] on the 
severity of the alleged harm, rather than on a welfarist assessment of whether the 
defendant’s activity is socially desirable on net.”128 Assessing the severity of harms 
caused by climate change is something that courts can manage; determining whether 
the sale and use of fossil fuels was reasonable in light of their social benefits and 
 
122. Id. at 874–75. 
123. Id. at 876. 
124. 582 F.3d at 326–28. 
125. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 35–39. 
126. See People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 546, 548–49  
(Ct. App. 2017) (applying substantial factor analysis and joint and several liability); City of Chicago  
v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 134–36 (Ill. App. Ct.) (finding proximate cause requirement 
unmet and declining to apply market share liability theory), appeal denied, 833 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2005). 
127. AEP III, 582 F.3d at 329. 
128. Kysar, supra note 2, at 25.  
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harms seems less so.129 Even under an approach focused on cost-benefit balancing, 
however, climate change public nuisance claims still may prove manageable. Under 
California law, for example, courts’ analysis of the reasonableness of defendants’ 
conduct might well focus on defendants’ promotion of fossil fuels with knowledge 
of its hazards, rather than the sale of such fuels.130 On this narrower issue, plaintiffs 
may face challenges of proof, but the matter seems amenable to  
judicial management. 
The third Baker v. Carr factor, “the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” raises questions 
similar to the second factor. The district court in AEP found this factor “particularly 
pertinent,” observing that “[t]he scope and magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs seek 
reveals the transcendently legislative nature of this litigation.”131 In the court’s view, 
the plaintiffs’ request for a cap on defendants’ carbon dioxide emissions would 
“require[ ] identification and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, 
and national security interests.”132 The Second Circuit rejected this analysis, 
however, and explained that applying common law nuisance to climate change 
would require no initial policy determination.133 Where plaintiffs seek only damages 
or abatement, as opposed to injunctive relief, courts can focus on the harms 
suffered by the plaintiff and defendant’s responsibility for those harms, rather than 
engaging in a policy determination better suited to the political branches.134  
2. Political Question Doctrine in the Supreme Court 
District courts’ readiness to apply the political question doctrine in climate 
change cases stands in sharp contrast with the Supreme Court’s general reluctance 
to find political questions. In Baker v. Carr itself, the Court held that allegations that 
a state apportionment statute violated the Equal Protection Clause did not present 
a political question.135 Moreover, since Baker was decided in 1962, the Supreme 
Court has rarely denied jurisdiction on political question grounds.136 Until the 
 
129. See id. at 21 (suggesting that under a balancing approach, “plaintiffs will face the difficult 
prospect of demonstrating that the defendant’s activities fail a social welfare cost-benefit test”); Gifford, 
Climate Change, supra note 2, at 255 (“Courts are inherently institutionally incapable of establishing 
rational, principled criteria for determining which emissions are ‘unreasonable’ in the context of specific 
litigation affecting only a handful of named defendants.”). 
130. See Albert C. Lin & Michael Burger, State Public Nuisance Claims and Climate Change 
Adaptation, 36 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 49, 89–90 (2018) (discussing ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227  
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 529–30). 
131. AEP I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), 
rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
132. 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272, 274. 
133. AEP III, 582 F.3d at 331. 
134. The failure of the political branches to regulate GHG emissions, the court of appeals 
further noted, only underscored the existence of regulatory gaps to be filled via the common law. 582 
F.3d at 330. 
135. 369 U.S. 186, 226–27 (1962). 
136. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90  
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1966 (2015). 
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Court’s 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, “a majority of the Court ha[d] 
found only two [cases] to present political questions, and both involved strong 
textual anchors for finding that the constitutional decision rested with the political 
branches.”137 In the first of these cases, Gilligan v. Morgan, the Court dismissed a 
suit by Kent State students alleging negligent training of the National Guard and 
demanding judicial supervision of the Guard’s training and operations.138 The 
Constitution explicitly vests in Congress the responsibility “for organizing, arming, 
and disciplining . . . the Militia,” the Court explained, making the matter a political 
question.139 In the second case, Nixon v. United States, the Court dismissed a 
challenge to a Senate committee’s taking of evidence in the impeachment 
proceedings of a former federal judge.140 The case presented a political question, 
the Court emphasized, in light of the Constitution’s “textual commitment” to the 
Senate of the “sole Power to try all impeachments.”141 
Cases regarding the 2000 presidential election further suggest the limited reach 
of the political question doctrine.142 One of the central issues in the  
litigation—“whether the state court had erroneously interpreted state law such that 
electors would be appointed contrary to the manner selected by the state 
legislature”—seemingly presented a political question governed by the 
Constitution’s text.143 As Rachel Barkow has contended, the Constitution (as 
amended by the Twelfth Amendment) expressly vests Congress with the authority 
to open states’ certifications of their electoral votes and to count those votes, an 
authority that presumably extends to determining whether proper procedures for 
selecting electors had been followed.144 The momentous nature of the  
litigation—which essentially would determine the outcome of the 2000 presidential 
election—further pointed in favor of dismissal.145 The Court nevertheless decided 
the cases without even mentioning the political question doctrine.146 
The Court explicitly rejected a political question argument a decade later in 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton.147 The plaintiff in Zivotofsky, who was born in 
Jerusalem, sought to have Israel listed as his birthplace on his passport.148 Although 
Congress had enacted a law directing the State Department to honor such requests, 
the State Department declined to do so based on its longstanding policy of not 
 
137. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and 
the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 268 (2002).  
138. 413 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1973). 
139. Id. at 6–7 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16). 
140. 506 U.S. 224, 251 (1993). 
141. Id. at 228–29 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6). 
142. See Barkow, supra note 137, at 273. 
143. Id. at 277. 
144. See id. at 277–78. 
145. See id. at 295–96. 
146. See Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000); see also Barkow, supra 
note 137, at 275, 300. 
147. 566 U.S. 189, 191 (2012). 
148. Id. at 193. 
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taking a position on Jerusalem’s political status.149 The lower courts held that the 
case presented a political question because the executive branch possessed exclusive 
authority over the matter.150 Notwithstanding the foreign policy interests at stake 
and the potential political implications of a court decision, the Supreme Court 
deemed the matter justiciable.151 The plaintiffs sought only to enforce a specific 
statutory right, the Court explained, and the courts could resolve the plaintiffs’ claim 
by undertaking a “familiar judicial exercise” of deciding whether the plaintiffs’ 
interpretation of the statute was correct and whether the statute  
was constitutional.152 
Finally, the Supreme Court held in Rucho v. Common Cause that political 
gerrymandering presents a nonjusticiable political question.153 Rucho settled an issue 
with which the Court had struggled for decades. In 1986, a splintered Court had 
deemed partisan gerrymandering claims to be justiciable in Davis v. Bandemer.154 
Eighteen years later, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, Justice Scalia authored a plurality opinion 
contending that such claims were not justiciable and declaring that courts had failed 
to develop a workable standard for evaluating them.155 However, Justice Kennedy, 
whose concurrence provided the critical fifth vote for dismissal, declined to find 
that the case presented a political question on the grounds that suitable standards 
for identifying an unconstitutional gerrymander might still emerge.156 Returning to 
the issue in Rucho, the Court concluded that it was “not equipped to apportion 
political power as a matter of fairness.”157 Focusing on the second Baker v. Carr 
factor, the Court declared, “There are no legal standards discernible in the 
Constitution for making such judgments, let alone limited and precise standards that 
are clear, manageable, and politically neutral.”158 
Viewed against these Supreme Court precedents, the climate change public 
nuisance cases present an improbable setting for applying the political question 
doctrine.159 In contrast to the first two post-Baker instances where the Court found 
a political question—military operations and impeachment—the climate change 
cases present no textual constitutional commitment of the issues to the political 
branches. And in contrast to Rucho, public nuisance does not involve the 
 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 195. 
151. Id. at 202. 
152. Id. at 196. 
153. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2487 (2019). 
154. 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986), abrogated by Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484. 
155. 541 U.S. 267, 278–81 (2004). 
156. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 311–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
157. 139 S. Ct. at 2499. 
158. Id. at 2500. 
159. Indeed, the Supreme Court opinion in AEP II, with Justice Sotomayor recused, noted that 
“[f]our [m]embers of the Court would hold . . . that no . . . threshold obstacle [including political 
question doctrine] bars review.” 564 U.S. 410, 420, 420 n.6 (2011); see also Gifford, Climate Change, supra 
note 2, at 256 (conceding that “employing the political question doctrine to deny jurisdiction in climate 
change litigation would extend the doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries.”). 
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apportionment of political power, a matter that is inherently political. While courts 
may be called to balance costs and benefits in analyzing public nuisance, such 
balancing presents no greater adjudicative difficulties and involves no more of a 
policy determination than other decisions courts routinely issue. 
Ultimately, when a court concludes that public nuisance presents a political 
question, the political branches are left to decide whether climate change (or some 
other alleged problem) constitutes a public nuisance. Such a stance is nonsensical in 
the vast majority of jurisdictions where public nuisance is a common law claim 
because courts—not legislatures or agencies—decide common law claims.160  
B. Standing 
Several district court opinions from the first wave of climate change litigation, 
including Kivalina and Comer, dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing.161 
Although standing has not played a significant role in more recent climate change 
public nuisance decisions, the defendants in the Oakland and New York City cases 
have raised similar arguments involving causation.162 
The Kivalina district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they 
could not trace their harms to the defendants or any other specific entity.163 
Addressing plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the causation element of standing, the 
court deemed it “entirely irrelevant whether any defendant ‘contributed’ to the 
harm” in the absence of a legal limit on GHG emissions.164 The district court in 
Comer also dismissed the public nuisance and other common law claims before it 
for lack of standing.165 Although the court’s written opinion did not elaborate on 
the standing issue, it can be inferred from the Fifth Circuit panel’s opinion reversing 
 
160. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era 
of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 413 (2011); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 112–13 (2007) (suggesting that courts, rather than misapply political question 
doctrine, should simply dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). 
161. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2009), 
aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1000 (2013); Comer II,  
No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 
(5th Cir. 2009), vacated and reh’g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010). 
162. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
First Amendment Complaint at 19–22, 20 n.13, BP I, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018)  
(No. 3:17-cv-06011-WHA), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/
uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2018/20180419_docket-317-cv-06011_motion-to-dismiss-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XM99-M2L6] (setting out causation arguments and citing district court opinion in 
Kivalina); Memorandum of Law of Chevron Corp., ConocoPhillips, and Exxon Mobil  
Corp. Addressing Common Grounds in Support of Their Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 
Complaint at 34–35, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)  
(No. 1:18-cv-00182-JFK), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/
uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2018/20180330_docket-118-cv-00182_memorandum-of-law-3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24HM-DA6Q] (contesting various elements of standing, including causation). 
163. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 880–81. 
164. 663 F. Supp. 2d at 880. 
165. Comer II, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1. 
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the trial court that the Comer plaintiffs’ claims likewise had foundered  
on causation.166  
Application of standing doctrine to common law tort claims essentially 
requires courts to take a preliminary peek at the merits: standing’s requirements of 
injury, traceability, and redressability overlap with proof of plaintiffs’ harm, whether 
defendants caused that harm, and the relief to which plaintiffs may be entitled.167 
This overlap raises serious doubts as to whether standing is even applicable to 
common law claims.168 Common law claims inherently belong before Article III 
courts, and a plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate harm or causation should lead to 
dismissal on the substantive merits, not dismissal for lack of standing.169 Even if a 
standing inquiry were appropriate, the climate change public nuisance plaintiffs 
would likely be able to satisfy its requirements in most instances.170 The  
plaintiffs—often state and local governments—can point to concrete injuries from 
rising sea levels and increased risks of catastrophic fire, heat waves, and other 
consequences of climate change.171 Moreover, suits for damages or abatement 
would redress such injuries.172 
Causation might pose a more difficult question, and it has been the most 
contested element of standing in the district court climate change public nuisance 
opinions. Yet in most instances, the causal link between climate change plaintiffs’ 
injury and defendants’ conduct seems sufficient to demonstrate standing. The 
requirement that a plaintiff’s injury be “fairly traceable” to defendant’s conduct, 
which the Supreme Court has described as “relatively modest,” is less stringent than 
 
166. The Fifth Circuit, after noting that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged injury in fact and 
redressability—which had not been contested by the defendants—focused its analysis on causation. 
Comer I, 585 F.3d 855, 863–64 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated and reh’g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010). The 
court rejected the defendants’ contentions that causation was too attenuated and that their alleged 
contributions to plaintiffs’ injuries were too minimal. Id. at 864–67. 
167. See Lin & Burger, supra note 130, at 71–72. 
168. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 160, at 388–89. 
169. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 160, at 413; Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 247 
(noting that standing typically is applied to statutory or constitutional claims and that “courts usually 
hold that the proper ground for dismissal of a tort claim is on substantive grounds, not the  
standing issue”). 
170. Furthermore, there is little doubt that the plaintiffs will litigate these cases vigorously, thus 
satisfying standing’s underlying purpose of ensuring judicial decision making in the context of an 
adversarial process. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968); see Siegel, supra note 160, at 88–89 
(acknowledging importance of adversarial presentation of issues to sound decision making, but 
questioning the ability of standing doctrine to advance that purpose). 
171. See Swan, supra note 2, at 1259–60 (noting that in “public nuisance cases, the common law 
has traditionally offered a kind of plenary public nuisance standing to municipalities”). 
172. See Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 244 (observing that in Kivalina, “where the 
requested remedy was damages, there was obviously no problem with the court’s ability to redress the 
plaintiffs’ harm through damage awards if the court traced the plaintiff’s harm to the  
defendant’s conduct”). 
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the requirement of tort causation.173 In AEP, the Second Circuit recognized the 
modest nature of this requirement when it held that plaintiffs needed only to show 
that a “pollutant causes or contributes to the kind of injuries alleged by the 
plaintiffs.”174 Allegations that a defendant’s contribution to the problem is too 
small, the Second Circuit added, are “best left to the rigors of evidentiary proof at a 
future state of the proceedings, rather than dispensed with as a threshold question 
of constitutional standing.”175  
Evidence linking GHG emissions and climate change impacts has become 
stronger with time.176 As a result, demonstrating that a plaintiff’s harm is fairly 
traceable to a defendant’s conduct is likely to be easier than at the time of the district 
court rulings in Comer and Kivalina. Proximate causation—which incorporates 
societal judgments regarding whether defendants should be held legally responsible 
for fairly traceable harms—presents a more challenging issue for plaintiffs.177 
However, analysis of that issue should occur when a court considers the substantive 
merits of a public nuisance claim, not as a threshold matter. 
C. Other Separation-of-Powers Rationales  
In recent climate change public nuisance decisions, separation-of-powers 
rationales have appeared in the form of doctrines aimed at limiting courts’ role in 
foreign affairs. Both the Oakland and New York City courts, when confronted with 
public nuisance claims involving foreign GHG emissions, expressed  
separation-of-powers concerns analogous to those underlying the political question 
doctrine. The New York City court held, “[T]o the extent that the City seeks to hold 
Defendants liable for damages stemming from foreign greenhouse gas emissions, 
the City’s claims are barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality and the 
need for judicial caution in the face of ‘serious foreign policy consequences.’”178 
Similarly, the Oakland court declared that “the principles underlying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality” warrant “great caution before fashioning 
 
173. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 171 (1997); Comer I, 585 F.3d 855, 864 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(citing cases), vacated and reh’g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010); AEP III, 582 F.3d 309, 345–47 
(discussing cases), rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
174. 582 F.3d at 346. 
175. Id. at 347.  
176. See Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil 
Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 229 (2014) (finding that nearly  
two-thirds of industrial carbon dioxide and methane emissions can be traced to ninety industrial carbon 
producers); Brenda Ekwurzel, James Boneham, M.W. Dalton, Richard Heede, Roberto J. Mera, Myles 
R. Allen & Peter C. Frumhoff, The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2, Surface Temperature, and Sea Level 
from Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 579 (2017) (using the climate 
model to quantify contribution of leading carbon producers’ emissions to specific climate impacts, 
including temperature increase and sea level rise); PAUL GRIFFIN, THE CARBON MAJORS  
DATABASE: CDP CARBON MAJORS REPORT 2017 (2017). 
177. Kysar, supra note 2, at 29–41. 
178. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Jesner 
v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018)). 
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federal common law in areas touching on foreign affairs.”179 In the context of the 
climate change public nuisance claims, however, the applicability of judicial caution 
and the presumption against extraterritoriality is highly questionable. Reliance on 
these rationales underscores trial courts’ continuing reluctance to adjudicate the 
substance of public nuisance. 
1. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory 
interpretation that “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with 
respect to domestic, not foreign, matters.”180 In analyzing whether a statute applies 
extraterritorially, a court first asks whether a clear affirmative indication in the 
statute rebuts the presumption against extraterritoriality.181 If the statute contains 
no clear indication of extraterritorial application, a court must then “look to the 
statute’s focus” to “determine whether the case involves a domestic application of 
the statute.”182 
The public nuisance climate change opinions have extensively cited two 
Supreme Court decisions involving the presumption, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co. and Jesner v. Arab Bank. In Kiobel, the Supreme Court applied the presumption 
to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).183 Kiobel acknowledged that courts “typically apply 
the presumption [against extraterritoriality] to discern whether an Act of Congress 
regulating conduct applies abroad.”184 The ATS “does not regulate conduct,” as the 
Court observed, but is a “strictly jurisdictional” statute “that allow[s] federal courts 
to recognize certain causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms of 
international law.”185 The Court nonetheless applied the presumption to the ATS 
because “the principles underlying the canon of interpretation similarly constrain 
courts considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS.”186 In 
Jesner, the Court addressed an issue Kiobel left unresolved: whether foreign 
corporations may be sued under the ATS.187 Answering that question in the 
negative, the Court concluded that separation-of-powers and foreign policy 
concerns underlying the presumption counseled against allowing ATS actions 
against foreign corporations.188  
 
179. BP I, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1025, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated, 960 F.3d 570 (9th  
Cir. 2020), modified, 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020). 
180. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010), superseded by statute,  
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124  
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
181. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). 
182. Id. at 2101. 
183. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116–17 (2013). 
184. Id. at 116. 
185. Id. at 116. 
186. Id. at 116. 
187. Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1398 (2018).  
188. Id. at 1403, 1407.  
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Relying heavily on Jesner, the New York City court applied the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to the plaintiffs’ common law claims.189 Jesner, the court 
reasoned, was not limited to the ATS, but more broadly counseled against 
recognizing causes of actions that may implicate the laws and policies of foreign 
governments.190 Similarly, the Oakland court found the plaintiffs’ efforts to apply 
public nuisance to foreign emissions “counter to . . . the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.”191 Quoting Kiobel, the Oakland court stated that “‘the danger of 
unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified’ 
where ‘the question is not what Congress has done but instead what courts  
may do.’”192  
Although this reluctance to adjudicate claims involving foreign emissions may 
be understandable, the Oakland and New York City courts erred in applying the 
federal presumption against extraterritoriality. First, the presumption is a canon of 
statutory interpretation; it is irrelevant to common law claims such as those asserted 
by the New York City plaintiffs.193 Choice-of-law rules, not principles of statutory 
interpretation, govern the applicability of common law to conduct occurring outside 
the United States.194 Second, where a public nuisance claim is based on statute—as 
in California195—state law rather than federal law governs the existence and scope 
of any presumption against extraterritoriality.196 Third, any presumption against 
extraterritoriality (whether federal or state) is arguably irrelevant because the climate 
change public nuisance cases may not even involve the extraterritorial application 
of law. Under federal law, whether a claim involves extraterritorial application of 
 
189. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
190. Id. (quoting Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1399, for the proposition “that where an action may have 
significant foreign relations implications, ‘recognizing such causes should make courts particularly wary 
of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.’”). 
191. BP I, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated, 960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020), 
modified, 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020). 
192. Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013)). 
193. See William S. Dodge, Misusing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Climate 
Change Litigation, 1 CTS. & JUST. L.J. 118, 121 (2019); E.E.O.C v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
248 (1991) (describing presumption as a canon of construction for ascertaining congressional intent). 
194. See Dodge, supra note 193, at 123; Brief of Conflict of Laws and Foreign Relations Law 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal of the District Court’s Decision 
at 7, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Conflict of Laws 
Brief ], http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-
documents/2018/20181115_docket-18-2188_amicus-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L7Z-6QPK]. 
Under New York choice-of-law rules, the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest—normally 
the locus of the plaintiffs’ injuries or property—would apply. See Dodge, supra note 193, at 123.  




196. See Dodge, supra note 193, at 122–23 (noting that California’s presumption against 
extraterritoriality generally turns on the location of the conduct, but has not been applied when conduct 
outside the state causes injury within the state). For cases recognizing California’s presumption against 
extraterritoriality, see Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 248 (Cal. 2011); Diamond Multimedia 
Sys., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 968 P.2d 539, 553 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1003.  
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law is determined by the focus of the statute (in the case of a legislative enactment) 
or the claim.197 The focus of a public nuisance claim is the place where the 
interference with a public right or public property occurs—which in the climate 
change public nuisance cases involves a domestic application of law.198 Under 
California law, adjudicating public nuisance actions involving foreign GHG 
emissions may not involve the extraterritorial application of state law either; the 
critical issues are whether the crucial element(s) of a claim occurred in California 
and the comparative impairment to the law of the respective states involved.199 
Neither the New York City nor Oakland courts addressed these issues. 
2. Judicial Caution 
The “judicial caution” invoked in the Oakland and New York City opinions 
likewise originates in ATS jurisprudence. The notion of judicial caution first 
appeared in the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which held 
that a private right of action could be brought under the ATS for certain torts in 
violation of the law of nations.200 In 1789, when the ATS was enacted, three specific 
torts were actionable: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.201 Beyond these three, Sosa explained, “courts should 
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the [three] 18th-century paradigms.”202 It was in this 
 
197. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010), superseded by statute,  
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101, 2108, 2111 (2016) (holding that focus 
of RICO’s private right of action was domestic injury to business and property and dismissing plaintiffs’ 
claims for foreign injury even though defendants engaged in conduct in the United States); Dodge, supra 
note 193, at 121. 
198. See Conflict of Laws Brief, supra note 194, at 7 n.3. 
199. Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 927–37 (Cal. 2006) (applying a 
California law prohibiting the unauthorized recording of telephone conversations to a Georgia 
defendant that recorded its calls with California residents and applying “comparative impairment 
analysis” of laws of respective jurisdictions). In cases when out-of-state conduct causes in-state injury, 
California has looked to conflict-of-law principles, rather than any presumption against 
extraterritoriality, to determine the applicable law. See Brief of Conflict of Laws and Foreign Relations 
Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellants and Reversal of the District Court’s 
Decision, BP IV, 960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 17-cv-06011) [hereinafter Oakland Amicus Brief ]. 
The “comparative impairment” analysis that California applies to resolve conflicts of law requires a 
court to “evaluate[ ] and compare[ ] the nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdiction in the 
application of its own law ‘to determine which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were 
subordinated to the policy of the other state’ and then ultimately appl[y] . . . ‘the law of the state whose 
interest would be the more impaired if its law were not applied.’” Kearney, 137 P.3d at 922 (citations 
omitted); see Oakland Amicus Brief, supra, at 7 (“When conduct and injury occur in different 
jurisdictions, the California Supreme Court regularly applies the law of the place of injury, recognizing 
that ‘a state may act to protect the interests of its own residents while in their home state.’”  
(citation omitted)). 
200. 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 725. 
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context—determining the specific claims that may be brought under the  
ATS—that the Supreme Court has urged “judicial caution.”203 An important reason 
behind this caution is the “adverse foreign policy consequences” that might follow 
from holding that “a foreign government or its agent has transgressed” international 
law,204 a concern echoed by the Court in Jesner.205  
Judicial caution, a concept grounded in ATS jurisprudence, has no history of 
application to the common law or to state claims.206 Granted, public nuisance cases 
like Oakland and New York City do raise some of the concerns expressed in Sosa 
and Jesner—including the potential ramifications of applying domestic law to 
foreign corporations and the preference that the political branches make policy 
decisions. However, there is no legal precedent for transplanting the notion of 
judicial caution from the ATS context to public nuisance. Indeed, the two contexts 
are distinguishable. In the ATS cases, the courts were asked to decide whether to 
create or expand an implied federal cause of action, and the Supreme Court 
expressed serious concern that such litigation had caused “significant diplomatic 
tensions”207 or might result in holding “a foreign government or its agent” liable for 
violating international norms.208 In the climate change cases, on the other hand, 
courts are being asked to apply a well-established cause of action—state public 
nuisance—to private foreign actors. 
Moreover, the fact that climate change is the subject of the Paris Agreement 
and other international agreements does not, as the Oakland and New York City 
courts reasoned, require the courts to decline to intervene.209 A public nuisance 
judgment against multinational fossil fuel companies would not conflict with any 
obligation under these agreements, nor would it impose any obligation on foreign 
governments. The fact that international climate agreements and these public 
nuisance cases address the same global problem—climate change—does not require 
courts to exercise judicial caution under existing law. Many domestic cases, such as 
product liability actions, involve foreign entities and affect international treaty 
negotiations, yet pose no justiciability problem.210 Indeed, the Oakland court 
conceded that it was applying judicial caution expansively when it stated that the 
 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 727–28. The Court did note the limited role of federal courts in making common 
law and recognizing private rights of action as further grounds for caution. Id. at 726–27. 
205. Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018).  
206. See Dodge, supra note 193, at 124 (“[T]he climate change cases involve the application of 
existing state laws not the creation of an implied cause of action under a federal statute.”). 
207. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1406. 
208. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727; Dodge, supra note 193, at 126. 
209. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (observing that 
plaintiffs’ claims “implicate countless foreign governments and their laws and policies”); BP I, 325  
F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (noting that “[g]lobal warming is already the subject of 
international agreements” and worrying that the imposition of liability “would effectively allow 
plaintiffs to govern conduct and control energy policy on foreign soil”), vacated, 960 F.3d 570 (9th  
Cir. 2020), modified, 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020). 
210. See Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 252. 
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ATS precedents stood for a “broader point . . . that federal courts should exercise 
great caution before fashioning federal common law in areas touching on  
foreign affairs.”211 
D. Federalism Rationales 
The recent wave of climate change public nuisance cases generally asserts 
public nuisance claims founded on state law.212 Not surprisingly, the Oakland and 
New York City district courts have relied on federalism-based rationales, in addition 
to separation-of-powers rationales, to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims. 
1. Uniquely Federal Interests 
In denying the plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state court, the Oakland 
court held that federal common law “necessarily governed” the plaintiffs’ public 
nuisance claims.213 To support this holding, the court cited legal doctrine 
authorizing federal courts to fashion federal common law if “necessary to protect 
uniquely federal interests.”214 Uniquely federal interests, the Supreme Court has 
explained, involve those  
narrow areas [that are] . . . concerned with the rights and obligations of the 
United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the 
conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and 
admiralty cases. In these instances, our federal system does not permit the 
controversy to be resolved under state law, either because the authority and 
duties of the United States as sovereign are intimately involved or because 
the interstate or international nature of the controversy makes it 
inappropriate for state law to control.215 
As discussed more extensively elsewhere, the areas involving “uniquely federal 
interests” are far narrower than the Oakland court understood them to be.216 The 
Supreme Court has explained that the “rights and obligations of the United States” 
are implicated when the United States’ contractual rights and obligations are at issue 
or when federal officials may be held liable for actions taken in the course of their 
duties.217 Similarly, “interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting 
rights of States or our relations with foreign nations” refer specifically to disputes 
involving questions of international law, the act of state doctrine, or competing 
interests of states in their sovereign capacity.218  
 
211. 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1028. 
212. See supra Section I.C.5, I.C.6. 
213. BP III, No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018), vacated 
sub nom. BP II, 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020). 
214. Id. at *2 (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)). 
215. Tex. Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641. 
216. See Lin & Burger, supra note 130, at 64–66. 
217. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–05 (1988). 
218. See Diane P. Wood, Back to the Basics of Erie, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 673, 692–95 
(2014) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641). 
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The climate change cases do not fall within any of the categories of cases that 
the Court has identified as involving “uniquely federal interests.” The cases are not 
admiralty cases, they do not concern the rights or obligations of the United States 
or of federal officials, and they do not implicate the conflicting rights of states or 
relations with foreign nations. The Oakland court nevertheless concluded that the 
“plaintiffs’ claims, if any, are governed by federal common law” because the 
problem of climate change “crie[s] out for a uniform and comprehensive solution,” 
“governed by as universal a rule of apportioning responsibility as is available.”219 
While the court correctly described climate change as a global threat, its analysis did 
not establish the existence of “interstate and international disputes implicating the 
conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations”220 that would 
warrant the application of federal common law. 
2. Foreign Policy Preemption 
The concerns raised by the Oakland and New York City district courts under 
the rubric of judicial caution221 might be more suitably addressed through the 
doctrine of foreign policy preemption. Foreign policy preemption of state law, 
which may involve either field preemption or conflict preemption, allows “concern 
for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations” to override “an 
exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations.”222 Field preemption 
applies where “the Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively to the National 
Government,” regardless of whether the federal government has acted.223 In these 
areas of “exclusive[ ] federal competence,” states may not intrude, even if state law 
does not conflict with federal policy.224 However, if a state is addressing a traditional 
state responsibility, courts consider conflict preemption, which—in the case of 
conflict between state law and federal obligations—balances “the strength or the 
traditional importance of the state concern asserted” against “the strength of the 
federal foreign policy.”225  
Field preemption is inapplicable to climate change public nuisance claims 
seeking abatement or damages because such claims do not involve foreign policy 
matters entrusted by the Constitution to the federal government. Only under an 
extremely expansive definition of foreign affairs—one that encompasses state laws 
having an impact on foreign corporations—might field preemption arguably apply. 
Such a definition would represent a dramatic departure from precedent226 and 
 
219. 2018 WL 1064293, at *3, *5. 
220. Tex. Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641. 
221. See supra Section II.C.2. 
222. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)). 
223. Id. at 419 n.11. 
224. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 442 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
225. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11. 
226. Under those precedents, courts are to focus on the “real purpose” of the state law to 
determine whether it concerns an area of traditional state responsibility. Movsesian v. Victoria 
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preempt wide swaths of state regulation.227 Indeed, because public nuisance claims, 
whether based on statute or common law, reflect the exercise of a state’s traditional 
police powers,228 conflict preemption is the appropriate lens for analysis. Yet the 
conditions for finding conflict preemption are not met either, as the doctrine 
requires an affirmative federal act “fit to preempt” state law, such as a treaty or 
executive agreement with which the state law would interfere.229 No such act exists 
in the area of climate change, where U.S. pledges under the Paris Agreement merely 
commit to achieving minimum standards but do not bar further action by states.  
3. A “Multiplicity of Standards” Argument? 
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of “uniquely federal interests” doctrine 
and foreign policy preemption, a more plausible argument can be made against 
applying state public nuisance standards to foreign GHG emissions. In International 
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act precludes a 
source of water pollution from being subjected to pollution standards other than 
those derived from federal law or the law of the state in which the source is 
located.230 Subjecting a polluter to multiple standards, the Court explained, “would 
lead to chaotic confrontation between sovereign states” and make it difficult, if not 
impossible, for a polluter to comply with those standards.231 Interests of efficiency 
and fairness might similarly counsel against subjecting a foreign GHG emitter to 
the standards of multiple nations, let alone the standards of multiple states and other 
subnational entities. The Oakland court essentially adopted this line of reasoning in 
denying the plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state court: 
Taking the complaints at face value, the scope of the worldwide 
predicament demands the most comprehensive view available, which in 
our American court system means our federal courts and our federal 
common law. A patchwork of fifty different answers to the same 
fundamental global issue would be unworkable. This is not to say that the 
ultimate answer under our federal common law will favor judicial relief. 
But it is to say that the extent of any judicial relief should be uniform across 
our nation.232 
Ouellette’s relevance, however, is limited by the fact that it was a statutory 
interpretation case. As the Court expressly noted, the imposition of multiple 
 
Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, a state’s efforts “to vindicate the claims of 
Holocaust survivors,” Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 426, to provide redress to Armenian genocide victims, 
Movsesian, 670 F.3d at 1076, or to “withhold[ ] remittances to legatees residing in Communist 
countries,” Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440, have been preempted.  
227. Cf. Conflict of Laws Brief, supra note 194, at 21 (suggesting extreme examples of 
preemption where foreign policy consequences are sufficient to invalidate state law). 
228. See Lin, supra note 9, at 973. 
229. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416–19. 
230. 479 U.S. 481, 494–99 (1987). 
231. Id. at 496–97 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
232. BP III, No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018), vacated 
sub nom. BP II, 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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standards would “serious[ly] interfere[ ] with the achievement of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress,” which had sought to establish an efficient and 
predictable permit system through the Clean Water Act.233 In the climate change 
public nuisance cases, by contrast, no permitting system governs the foreign GHG 
emissions of the defendants. More importantly, if a foreign defendant’s GHG 
emissions have negatively impacted a plaintiff, efficiency and fairness  
concerns—as well as the international law obligation not to cause transboundary 
environmental harm234—argue in favor of internalizing the costs of those emissions 
by requiring the defendant to abate or compensate for those impacts. Rather than 
dismissing state law–based claims because of the global nature of climate change, 
courts at least should address whether the defendants’ conduct has created a  
public nuisance.  
E. Displacement 
Having recast the state public nuisance claims as federal claims, the Oakland 
court concluded that the portion of those claims pertaining to domestic conduct 
was displaced by statute.235 The Oakland court relied on the Supreme Court’s 
holding in AEP that the Clean Air Act displaced federal nuisance claims against 
fossil fuel–fired power plants.236 Although the Oakland court initially suggested that 
the claims before it might be distinguishable because they focused on the 
production and sale of fossil fuels rather than their combustion,237 it later dismissed 
the case based on its conclusion that “Congress has vested in the EPA the problem 
of greenhouse gases.”238 
The Supreme Court’s displacement analysis in AEP, however, did not extend 
so broadly. The CAA, the Court noted, focuses on regulating emission sources, 
directing the EPA to list categories of stationary sources of air pollution and to 
establish emission standards for those sources.239 Nowhere in the opinion does the 
Court suggest that the statute’s delegation of authority over emission sources—and 
the accompanying displacement of common law—extends beyond the polluting 
activity itself. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF DISTRICT COURTS’ DODGING 
District courts have resorted to a range of avoidance doctrines to dodge the 
substance of climate change public nuisance claims.240 Perhaps as a result of a 
 
233. 479 U.S. at 493. 
234. See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 472 (5th ed. 2015). 
235. BP III, 2018 WL 1064293 at *4. 
236. AEP II, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011); BP III, 2018 WL 1064293, at *4. 
237. 2018 WL 1064293, at *4. 
238. BP I, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated, 960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020), 
modified, 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020). 
239. 564 U.S. at 424. 
240. See supra Part II. 
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divided Supreme Court’s affirmance of jurisdiction in AEP, the political question 
and standing doctrines cited frequently in the early cases have given way to the use 
of other avoidance doctrines. Admittedly, courts’ reluctance to adjudicate the 
substance of climate change public nuisance claims is not unexpected.241 Climate 
change cases present complex circumstances for applying public nuisance doctrine, 
precedents for doing so are nonexistent, and the economic and political implications 
of a nuisance finding could be severe.242 Yet as this Part explores, the dodging of 
public nuisance has ramifications beyond individual case outcomes for the 
avoidance doctrines, the rule of law, and society’s overall response to  
climate change.  
A. The District Courts Have Overextended Avoidance Doctrines 
Outside of the climate change context, commentators have roundly criticized 
the courts for their “messy and unprincipled” application of political question, 
standing, and other avoidance doctrines.243 The following discussion will not rehash 
these critiques, which often allege the manipulation of these doctrines to avoid 
difficult questions or achieve politically and ideologically motivated results.244 
Consistent with these critiques, the district courts’ use of these doctrines in climate 
change cases has had the effect of avoiding the substance of public nuisance law. 
Yet as the discussion here will explain, the district court rulings in the climate change 
 
241. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 160, at 355 (opining that courts are “[u]nderstandably 
resistant to the claim that global climate change is an ordinary pollution nuisance of the kind adjudicated 
for centuries”). 
242. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]rying to force climate change into traditional common 
law categories calls into question basic features of tort law itself.”); Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 
2, at 204 (contending that “the public law model of tort litigation is the wrong tool for the job of 
addressing climate change and that wise judges should use the traditional doctrines of judicial restraint 
to reject the invitation to engage in faux legislation”).  
243. See, e.g., Ewing & Kysar, supra note 160, at 415; RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY  
A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 169 (5th ed. 2009) (criticizing 
Supreme Court justices’ manipulation of standing doctrine to reach desired outcomes); Siegel, supra 
note 160, at 89 (contending that the “standing doctrine does not bear any necessary relationship to 
vigorous advocacy[,] [n]or does it even serve as a suitable, if rough, proxy for the practical likelihood 
that a plaintiff will do a good job of illuminating issues for the courts”); William A. Fletcher, The 
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) (noting the “apparent lawlessness of many standing 
cases”); Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1,  
17–18 (2017) (recounting criticisms of lower courts’ application of political question doctrine); Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 
1277 (2006) (criticizing Supreme Court’s demand for judicially manageable standards, found most 
explicitly in political question doctrine, as “more often the products or outputs of constitutional 
adjudication than inherent elements of the Constitution’s meaning”); Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political 
Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600–01 (1976) (contending that courts in political question cases 
essentially affirm the constitutionality of action by the political branches rather than abstain from 
judicial review); John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 457 (2017) 
(contending that “lower court decisions have seriously misunderstood the [political question] doctrine 
by treating it as a limit on subject matter jurisdiction” and refusing to reach the merits of claims).  
244. See supra note 243, for detailed criticisms. 
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public nuisance cases have been especially unmoored and have strayed far from 
prior decisions. 
First, consider the political question doctrine. Baker v. Carr sets out a 
malleable, multifactor inquiry that can hardly be expected to generate consistent 
results. Nonetheless, the doctrine rests on a fairly straightforward premise: “[T]hat 
the Constitution vests authority to decide some constitutional questions in the 
political branches because of their unique institutional characteristics and 
strengths.”245 Indeed, the three post–Baker v. Carr cases where the Supreme Court 
found a political question all alleged constitutional violations.246 The plaintiffs in 
Rucho asserted violations of the First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and 
Elections Clause.247 The plaintiff in Nixon v. United States alleged a violation of the 
Impeachment Trial Clause.248 And the plaintiffs in Gilligan v. Morgan claimed 
deprivations of life and liberty without due process of law.249 For the political 
question doctrine to apply, it was not enough for defendants to show that the 
political branches were more capable than the courts of addressing the matter in 
question. Rather, these cases raised political questions because their determination 
was “entrusted to one of the political branches or involve[d] no judicially 
enforceable rights.”250  
Viewed against these precedents, the district courts’ invocations of the political 
question doctrine in AEP and Kivalina are striking. The plaintiffs in the climate 
change cases asserted common law public nuisance claims, not constitutional claims. 
By their very nature, common law claims are within the province of the courts, not 
the political branches, to decide.251 As the Supreme Court underscored in rejecting 
a political question claim in Zivotofsky, “the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide 
cases properly before it, even those it would gladly avoid.”252 Use of the political 
 
245. Barkow, supra note 137, at 242; Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 
230 (1986) (“The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which 
revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to 
the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.”); see Grove, supra note 136, at 1909 
(“[T]he political question doctrine instructs that the courts may not decide certain issues—most 
prominently, federal constitutional claims—at all.”); Henkin, supra note 243, at 599. The doctrine is also 
applied with some frequency to claims involving foreign affairs. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT  
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3534.2 (3d ed. 2008); see also Gifford, 
Climate Change, supra note 2, at 251 n.398 (citing tort actions in which federal courts of appeals applied 
political question doctrine). 
246. Pre-Baker Supreme Court decisions applying the doctrine also involved constitutional 
claims. See Barkow, supra note 137, at 253–63 (discussing pre-Baker cases). 
247. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019). 
248. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993). 
249. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973). 
250. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004)). 
251. The Supreme Court held in Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation that a federal common 
law claim to enforce aboriginal land rights did not present a political question. 470 U.S. 226, 249–50 
(1985). In doing so, the Court rejected arguments that the claim was nonjusticiable in light of Congress’s 
plenary power over Indian affairs and the need to adhere to a political decision already made. See id.  
252. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 194 (2012). 
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question doctrine—a doctrine aimed at safeguarding the separation of powers—to 
preclude courts from adjudicating non-constitutional common law claims 
demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the doctrine.  
The district courts’ invocation of standing in Kivalina and Comer likewise 
reflects a strained application of a doctrine aimed at upholding the separation of 
powers. Standing, which was developed as a mechanism for limiting challenges to 
government agency actions, is typically asserted by the political branches as a 
defense to statutory or constitutional claims.253 Properly applied, the doctrine bars 
individual citizens from raising generalized grievances about government and courts 
from engaging in the general supervision of government action (or inaction).254 The 
climate change public nuisance cases, however, involve challenges to private actions, 
not government actions. In this context, standing doctrine should be simply 
inapplicable.255 Admittedly, if the climate change plaintiffs were allowed to litigate 
the substance of public nuisance, they might face formidable obstacles to 
demonstrating injury or causation. Nonetheless, the proper ground for resolving 
these matters would be on the substantive merits, and not through a  
standing inquiry.256 
District courts’ application of foreign policy–related doctrines—namely, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and the notion of judicial caution—further 
exemplifies the misuse of separation-of-powers-based avoidance doctrines in 
climate change litigation. As explained above, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory interpretation that is simply irrelevant to 
common law claims.257 Moreover, courts must determine whether public nuisance 
law is being applied extraterritorially in the first instance—an inquiry that involves 
far more than considering the locus of the underlying conduct.258 Overlooking these 
fundamental points, the New York City and Oakland courts applied the presumption 
against extraterritoriality in the course of dismissing plaintiffs’ common law claims. 
As far as judicial caution is concerned, courts apply the concept in the narrow 
context of determining specific claims cognizable under the Alien Tort Statute.259 
The New York City and Oakland courts’ invocation of judicial caution outside the 
 
253. Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 247. 
254. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–76 (1992); Ewing & Kysar, supra note 160, at 
387–88. 
255. See supra text accompanying nn. 168–169. 
256. See Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 247; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 71 (7th ed. 2016) (“Injury to rights recognized at common law—property, contracts, and 
torts—are sufficient for standing purposes.”); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1290–91 (1976) (“The standing issue could hardly arise at common 
law . . . . There the question of plaintiff’s standing merged with the legal merits: On the facts pleaded, 
does this particular plaintiff have a right to the particular relief sought from the particular defendant 
from whom he is seeking it?”). 
257. See supra Section II.C.1. 
258. See id. 
259. See supra Section II.C.2. 
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ATS context, and in the absence of the foreign policy concerns raised in the ATS 
cases, was unprecedented and unwarranted. 
Finally, the Oakland court’s assertion that climate change public nuisance 
claims implicate “uniquely federal interests”—and thus cannot be governed by state 
law260—likewise represents a dramatic departure from precedents regarding what 
interests qualify as uniquely federal. Under those precedents, uniquely federal 
interests are at play when the United States’ rights and obligations are at issue and 
in disputes involving international or admiralty law.261 The climate change public 
nuisance cases implicate none of these interests. Rather than identifying such 
interests, the Oakland court held that the presumed advantages of federal legislation 
on climate change raised “uniquely federal interests” that precluded plaintiffs from 
asserting their state law claims.262 Here again, the district court invoked a doctrine 
without even purporting to adhere to doctrinal requirements. 
The application of political question, standing, and other avoidance doctrines 
to tort claims, even those involving transboundary pollution, is truly anomalous. 
This can be seen by contrasting the climate change cases with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.263 In Wyandotte, the state of Ohio 
invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction to abate an alleged nuisance resulting from 
pollution discharges originating in other states and Canada. Exercising its discretion 
not to hear the case, the Court noted the presence of complex and technical factual 
questions, as well as the involvement of other bodies in regulating the defendants’ 
conduct.264 The primary significance of the Wyandotte decision today is that it 
established the Court’s discretionary authority to decline original jurisdiction 
cases.265 Of particular relevance to the climate change public nuisance cases, 
however, is the Court’s finding that it had jurisdiction over the dispute. Although 
some of the allegedly tortious conduct occurred outside the United States, the Court 
firmly recognized its ability to hear the case: 
That we have jurisdiction seems clear enough. Beyond doubt, the 
complaint on its face reveals the existence of a genuine “case or 
controversy” between one State and citizens of another, as well as a foreign 
subject . . . . While we have refused to entertain, for example, original 
actions . . . that seek to embroil this tribunal in “political questions,” this 
Court has often adjudicated controversies between States and between a 
 
260. BP III, No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (quoting 
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)), vacated sub nom. BP II, 969 F.3d 
895 (9th Cir. 2020). 
261. See supra Section II.D.1. 
262. BP III, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2 (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 640). 
263. 401 U.S. 493 (1971). 
264. Id. at 502–05. 
265. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Hatch, Annotation, Construction and Application of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251, 
Implementing Original Jurisdiction of Supreme Court—Supreme Court Cases, 57 A.L.R. FED. 2d 199,  
§ 2 (2011). 
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State and citizens of another State seeking to abate a nuisance that exists 
in one State yet produces noxious consequences in another.266 
Wyandotte leaves no doubt that the federal courts can and should adjudicate 
public nuisance disputes involving transboundary pollution, and it casts grave doubt 
on district courts’ various efforts to avoid the substance of the climate change 
plaintiffs’ claims. 
B. No Harm, No Foul? 
Although district courts repeatedly have gone out of their way to apply 
avoidance doctrines in the climate change public nuisance cases, one might 
reasonably wonder whether their opinions really matter. Some of the district court 
rulings were reversed, and more recent decisions might face a similar fate on appeal. 
Even those opinions that survive might have limited precedential force. After all, 
these are only district court opinions.  
Moreover, the judiciary might view climate change litigation as sui generis. As 
Donald Gifford has observed, “Resolving issues such as which defendant 
contributed what ‘amount’ of global climate change, whether that contribution 
exceeded reasonable levels, and what should be done about it, is more polycentric, 
to an exponential degree than any set of issues a common law court has ever 
resolved.”267 However, courts have grappled with the substance of complex public 
interest public nuisance claims involving handguns, lead paint, and opioids.268 The 
contrast between courts’ treatment of these cases and their handling of the climate 
change cases suggests that courts view climate change cases as distinct. Consistent 
with this view, relatively few courts in non–climate change cases have cited to the 
opinions holding that climate change public nuisance claims present a political 
question. For instance, the district court opinion in AEP has been cited in ten other 
cases; of the six citing cases unrelated to climate change, none found the AEP 
court’s political question analysis applicable.269 Indeed, those opinions that do 
discuss the AEP court’s political question analysis tend to distinguish it.270  
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to suspect that the district courts’ 
pronouncements applying the avoidance doctrines in climate cases may influence 
other courts. Many of the climate change public nuisance opinions were published 
in the Federal Supplement reporter, and the cases have received much attention in 
legal circles and beyond.271 Moreover, while some district court rulings have been 
 
266. 401 U.S. at 495–96. 
267. Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 255. 
268. See supra Section I.B. 
269. The search was conducted on Westlaw on December 6, 2019. 
270. See, e.g., Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957, 970  
(D. Or. 2006) (noting that plaintiffs merely asked court to enforce statute and regulations, “not . . . to 
make a free-wheeling policy choice and decide whether global warming is, or is not, a serious threat or 
what measures should be taken to remedy that problem,” in contrast to AEP). 
271. See, e.g., Should Fossil-Fuel Companies Bear Responsibility for the Damage Their Products Do 
to the Environment?, WALL. ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2019, 2:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-
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reversed on appeal, those reversals themselves are of equivocal significance. In 
AEP, for instance, the Supreme Court was evenly divided on the political question 
and standing issues that had served as grounds for the district court’s dismissal. 
Thus, although the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s reversal of the 
district court on those issues, that affirmance carried no precedential weight.272 In 
Comer, a Fifth Circuit panel reversed the district court’s dismissal on political 
question and standing grounds, but the circuit’s subsequent decision to conduct en 
banc review led to vacatur of the panel opinion.273 And while the Ninth Circuit in 
Kivalina did not reverse the district court’s determination that the case presented a 
political question and that the plaintiffs lacked standing, neither did the court of 
appeals affirm the lower court on either of those grounds.274 Instead, the court of 
appeals dismissed the claims under displacement doctrine.275 
Furthermore, although one might argue that the climate change public 
nuisance cases are sui generis, the district court analyses generally fail to identify 
principled bases for limiting their reasoning to those cases. As a result, their 
opinions sow seeds of mischief in applying the avoidance doctrines.  
For example, several opinions—including AEP, Oakland, and Kivalina—have 
turned on courts’ reluctance to balance climate change harms against the benefits 
of fossil fuel use.276 However, courts frequently must—and do—undertake similarly 
difficult balancing analyses, whether in determining a defendant was negligent, an 
injunction is warranted, or a plaintiff’s constitutional rights (with respect to due 
process or the First Amendment, for example) have been violated.277 
Notwithstanding the difficulty of balancing and the policy implications that might 
flow from the results of a balancing inquiry, courts have not deemed these questions 




272. AEP II, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011). 
273. Comer III, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053 (5th Cir. 2010), mandamus denied, Comer IV, 562  
U.S. 1133 (2011). 
274. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 
U.S. 1000 (2013). 
275. Id. at 858. 
276. See AEP I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), 
rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011); BP I, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“[Q]uestions of how to 
appropriately balance these worldwide negatives [of fossil fuel combustion] against the worldwide 
positives of the energy itself . . . demand the expertise of our environmental agencies, our diplomats, 
our Executive, and at least the Senate.”), vacated, 960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020), modified, 969 F.3d 895 
(9th Cir. 2020); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 874–75 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(noting that factfinder would have to weigh various factors, including benefits derived from fossil fuel 
use, “against the risk that increasing greenhouse gases would in turn increase the risk of causing flooding 
along the coast of a remote Alaskan locale”), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569  
U.S. 1000 (2013). 
277. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE  
L.J. 943, 947 (1987). 
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crack open the door for courts to throw their hands up and declare such balancing 
unmanageable under political question, standing, or some other doctrine.  
Likewise, the New York City and Oakland courts’ dismissals were based in part 
on the concern that a legal dispute rooted in the common law could have serious 
consequences for foreign entities. Although these opinions spoke in terms of 
judicial caution and the presumption against extraterritoriality,278 this underlying 
concern could arise in numerous contexts. In today’s global economy, various 
branches of public law—including antitrust, securities, and environmental  
law—have serious implications for entities beyond the United States’ boundaries.279 
Private law actions as well—rooted in common law principles governing contract, 
tort, and property disputes—also often involve foreign entities.280 As a matter of 
fact, an extensive set of doctrines—including personal jurisdiction, forum non 
conveniens, international comity, and sovereign immunity—already govern the 
allocation of adjudicative authority over transnational litigation.281 If courts were to 
disregard these doctrines and instead follow the New York City and Oakland courts’ 
reasoning that possible foreign consequences render disputes nonjusticiable, one 
can imagine questionable dismissals in countless cases.  
Further abuses might follow from the expansive approach to the “uniquely 
federal interests” doctrine suggested by the Oakland opinion. The doctrine would 
no longer apply only when the United States’ rights and obligations or international 
or admiralty law are at issue. Instead, courts might be inclined to dismiss any conflict 
that might benefit from a comprehensive federal approach rather than the 
piecemeal application of state common law. Various social problems—ranging from 
opioid abuse and illegal drug trafficking to gun violence—could fall within this 
category. Yet surely, these matters do not involve uniquely federal interests, and their 
significance should not—in the absence of federal legislation—lead to preemption 
of state law on these matters. 
Finally, while this Article has focused on use of the avoidance doctrines by the 
federal courts, it is worth considering whether plaintiffs yet might be able to secure 
substantive rulings in state courts, particularly with respect to state law claims. State 
courts tend to apply the doctrines of standing and political question in a much less 
restrictive way than federal courts, if they apply those doctrines at all.282 Thus, state 
courts might offer more favorable prospects for reaching the substance of plaintiffs’ 
public nuisance claims. Worryingly, the course of the Oakland litigation before the 
district court suggested that plaintiffs might never get the opportunity to secure a 
 
278. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); BP I, 325 
F. Supp. 3d at 1026 (reasoning that plaintiffs’ claims “undoubtedly implicate the interests of countless 
governments, both foreign and domestic” because they seek to impose billions of dollars of liability “to 
abate the localized effects of an inherently global phenomenon”).  
279. See Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 67, 
92–95 (2009).  
280. See id. 
281. See id. at 77–80.  
282. See Gifford, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 250.  
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state court ruling: once the district court held that federal law necessarily governs 
the global problem of climate change, defendants’ removal of the case appeared 
decisive, as it eventually resulted in dismissal of the public nuisance  
claim—transformed from a state law claim to one based on federal law—on 
displacement grounds.283  
Recently, however, several federal district courts faced with similar claims have 
declined to follow the same course. For instance, in County of San Mateo v. Chevron, 
the district court remanded the plaintiffs’ state public nuisance claims to state court, 
reasoning that federal common law, because it had been displaced, could not 
preclude the plaintiffs from asserting state common law claims.284 Similarly, the 
district court in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C. remanded the claims 
before it to state court even though it found the Oakland district court’s removal 
ruling to be “well stated” and to “present[ ] an appealing logic.”285 Pointing to the 
well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only 
when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 
complaint, the Baltimore court concluded that it lacked federal question jurisdiction 
over the plaintiffs’ state public nuisance claims.286 Should these rulings survive on 
appeal,287 state courts may well be forced to address the substance of  
plaintiffs’ claims. 
C. Promoting the Rule of Law and Democratic Values 
Aside from their potential impacts on the scope of the avoidance doctrines, 
the district courts’ rulings have allowed courts to sidestep their fundamental duty to 
decide the specific cases brought before them. The failure to decide the substantive 
validity of plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims undermines the basic functions of tort 
law and the democracy-enhancing role of the judiciary. 
 
283. BP I, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024. 
284. 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d in part and dismissed in part, 960 F.3d 586 
(9th Cir. 2020). The court also declined to rule on defendants’ contention that the state law claims were 
preempted by federal statute, holding that the issue could be properly addressed by state courts upon 
remand. Id. at 938. 
285. Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538, 556 (D. Md. 2019), aff’d, 952 F.3d 
452 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, No. 19-1189, 2020 WL 5847132 (2020). 
286. Id. at 556–58. The district courts in Board of County Commissioners v. Suncor Energy Inc., 
405 F. Supp. 3d 947, 961–63 (D. Colo. 2019), aff’d in part and dismissed in part, 965 F.3d 792 (10th  
Cir. 2020), and Rhode Island v. Chevron Corporation, 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 147–51 (D.R.I. 2019), followed 
similar lines of reasoning in remanding the respective plaintiffs’ claims—all based on state law—to  
state court. 
287. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in County of San Mateo that removal 
was not proper under the federal-officer removal statute and held that it lacked jurisdiction over the 
rest of the district court’s remand order. 960 F.3d 586. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision affirming the district court in the Baltimore litigation, Mayor of Baltimore, 952 
F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2020).  See Mayor of Baltimore, 2020 WL 5847132 (Oct. 2, 2020). 
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1. Advancing the Functions of Tort Law 
What are the functions of the common law in areas, such as environmental 
law, that are governed largely by statute?288 Since 1970, statutes and regulations have 
come to dominate U.S. environmental law.289 However, the common law played a 
central role in addressing environmental problems prior to that time, and it has 
continued to serve as a critical backstop since.290 In particular, tort law serves a 
private law function of redressing private wrongs as well as public law functions of 
deterring unreasonable conduct, compensating victims, and spreading losses.291 
Statutory law has largely usurped tort law as to its public law functions, but even 
here, common law retains an important role. Political opposition, bureaucratic 
inertia, and increasingly rigorous demands for supporting data may prevent statutes 
and regulations from addressing serious problems wholly or in part.292 In such 
circumstances, the common law can fill statutory gaps, offering flexible remedies to 
deal with unanticipated, neglected, or overlooked factual contexts.293 Relatedly, 
judges and juries can tailor societal norms to specific situations.294 Moreover, 
because environmental statutes generally do not provide for compensatory 
damages,295 the common law serves as an essential mechanism for compensating 
victims of tortious conduct.  
Climate change presents circumstances in which tort law can fulfill its  
gap-filling potential. The Clean Air Act, the primary federal statute for addressing 
air pollution, was enacted in 1970, long before widespread recognition of climate 
change as a serious threat. In 1990, and again in 2009, Congress considered but 
failed to adopt statutory amendments that would have directly governed GHG 
emissions.296 And while the Obama administration attempted to regulate some 
emission sources through various components of the CAA,297 these efforts were 
 
288. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982) (noting 
transition from “a legal system dominated by the common law . . . to one in which statutes, enacted by 
legislatures, have become the primary source of law”). 
289. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 93. 
290. See HOLLY DOREMUS, ALBERT C. LIN & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY LAW 40 (6th ed. 2012). 
291. See Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1501, 1508–09 (2009). 
292. See Michael D. Axline, The Limits of Statutory Law and the Wisdom of Common Law, 38 
ENV’T L. REP. 10268, 10268 (2008). 
293. See Mark P. Nevitt & Robert V. Percival, Could Official Climate Denial Revive the Common 
Law as a Regulatory Backstop?, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 441, 493–94 (2018); DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 
290, at 40. 
294. See Axline, supra note 292, at 10274–75. 
295. See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 290, at 40; Klass, supra note 291, at 1570–71. 
296. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511–12 (2007); American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
297. See Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 310–13 (2014) (recounting EPA initiatives 
on climate change); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (Clean Power Plan). 
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largely tied up in the courts or rolled back by the Trump administration.298 Most 
sources of ongoing GHG emissions remain unregulated, and neither statutes nor 
regulations provide recourse for harms resulting from past GHG emissions. 
Climate change falls into a regulatory gap and at the same time has much in 
common with the landmark public nuisance case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper. 
Transboundary air pollution was at the heart of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, and it 
lies at the heart of the climate change public nuisance cases as well. To be sure, 
climate change is consistent with lay and historical understandings of public 
nuisance—it is at least as much of a nuisance as the smoke-belching factory next 
door or the incessantly noisy neighbor.299 Moreover, it readily satisfies many of the 
core elements of public nuisance: climate change substantially interferes with public 
health and various public rights. It is a pollution problem that affects the broader 
community—the very sort of situation that the public nuisance doctrine has 
historically addressed.300 But to describe climate change in such an understated 
manner does not do justice to the catastrophic harms that climate change threatens 
(and already has caused) for numerous publics around the globe. Indeed, one might 
better describe climate change as a particularly extreme example of  
public nuisance.301  
Yet while climate change constitutes an extraordinary interference with the 
rights of the global public, it hardly resembles an ordinary tort case. Unlike a 
straightforward scenario in which a single defendant’s discrete action injures an 
individual plaintiff, climate change involves innumerable parties who collectively 
harm multiple plaintiffs—indeed, the entire planet—over an extended period of 
time.302 Establishing the elements of public nuisance or any tort claim poses a 
formidable challenge for any plaintiff who reaches the merits phase of climate 
change tort litigation.303 One legal commentator suggested nearly a decade ago, “At 
each stage of the traditional tort analysis—duty, breach, causation, and harm—the 
climate change plaintiff finds herself bumping up against doctrines that are 
premised on a classical liberal worldview in which threats such as global climate 
change simply do not register.”304 Although climate change harms have become 
 
298. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019); Bethany A. Davis Noll  
& Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1, 24–26 (2019) (discussing litigation 
stays and delays with respect to Clean Power Plan). 
299. See Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 7, at 10120–21 (listing various environmental 
harms that courts have found to be public nuisances); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 100 (1977) (“The deepest doctrinal roots of modern environmental 
law are found in principles of nuisance.”). 
300. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
301. See Matthew F. Pawa, Global Warming: The Ultimate Public Nuisance, 39 ENV’T  
L. REP. 10230 (2009). 
302. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 160, at 369. 
303. See id. at 369–70. 
304. Kysar, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
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much more prominent and attribution science has made tremendous advances since 
then,305 formidable barriers of proof remain.  
Deciding climate change nuisance claims on their substantive merits 
nonetheless would advance the tort system’s objectives of clarifying legal obligations 
and reconciling potentially conflicting ideals of liberty and protection from harm.306 
Ultimately, it is uncertain whether climate change plaintiffs will be able to establish 
the elements necessary to prevail on their public nuisance claims. If plaintiffs 
succeed, they will obtain remedies for tortious wrongs. But even if plaintiffs fail, the 
adjudication of their claims on their substantive merits would fulfill important 
functions in contesting “visions of right, responsibility, and social order” and 
“articulat[ing] public understandings of morality.”307 Moreover, unsuccessful claims 
would underscore “gaps between the common law’s basic ideal of protection from 
harm imposed by others’ agency and the failure of other branches to step in when 
the complexity of such harm renders it unsuitable for judicial resolution.”308 In other 
words, by determining common law claims on their substantive merits, rather than 
dodging them, courts would make clear the common law’s limits as a gap-filler and 
thereby may force or invite action by the political branches.309 
Outside of the climate change context, courts have grappled with—and are 
continuing to grapple with—the substance of public interest public nuisance 
claims.310 In doing so, courts not only demonstrate that adjudication of such claims 
is possible, but they also advance the functions of tort law. Thus, although the lead 
paint litigation was largely unsuccessful, decisions in those cases made clear that tort 
law could provide no relief, and in their wake a number of municipalities enacted 
local laws aimed at reducing lead hazards by boosting inspection and remediation 
requirements in rental housing.311 A further example of tort law’s ability to promote 
conversations between the judiciary and other branches of government is occurring 
in regards to opioid litigation. The comparison between opioid litigation and climate 
change litigation is especially apt, as the two have in common a multiplicity of 
potential defendants and the potential for plaintiffs to seek seemingly boundless 
relief. Though “extremely complex,”312 opioid litigation is proceeding even as 
Congress enacted substantial legislation aimed at promoting prevention, treatment, 
 
305. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz & Radley Horton, 
The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 57, 77–140 (2020).  
306. Ewing & Kysar, supra note 160, at 378. 
307. Id. at 356. 
308. Id. at 356–57. 
309. Id. at 356–57; see also id. at 375 (“By struggling to apply common law principles to the 
harms of an ever more complex and interconnected world—and often precisely in failing to do so 
satisfactorily—courts deliver dignified, public pronouncements that legislative and administrative 
inertia have left our basic ideals unprotected.”). 
310. See supra Section I.B. 
311. See Katrina S. Korfmacher & Michael L. Hanley, Are Local Laws the Key to Ending 
Childhood Lead Poisoning?, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 757 (2013). 
312. Suggestions of Remand, supra note 72, at 2. 
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and recovery with respect to opioid abuse.313 Here and in other contexts, courts 
have found ways to deal with the multidimensionality and complexity of public 
interest public nuisance litigation, and they can do likewise in the climate  
change cases. 
2. Advancing Democratic Values Through the Courts 
Notwithstanding the well-established function of common law claims, 
decisions dodging the merits of public nuisance often suggest that judicial 
intervention would be undemocratic. Whether under the rubric of political question, 
standing, extraterritoriality, or judicial caution, trial courts have consistently 
broadcast the message that the political branches—and not the countermajoritarian 
institution of the judiciary—are the proper actors to address climate change. Climate 
change, these courts tell us, possesses features distinct from ordinary pollution 
problems that render it uniquely unsuitable for adjudication as a public nuisance. 
This assertion of climate change exceptionalism warrants closer  
examination: Namely, what features of climate change, if any, might place it beyond 
the bounds of judicial authority? At its core, climate change is an environmental 
pollution problem—a paradigmatic public nuisance in its interference with public 
rights. Although several features of climate change litigation might make its 
adjudication as a public nuisance challenging, none of them should preclude courts 
from deciding the cases. 
 Perhaps the most obvious difficulty presented by climate change litigation 
is the magnitude of the underlying problem, an aspect several courts have cited in 
their analyses. In Oakland v. BP, the order denying the plaintiffs’ motion to remand 
to state court stated: “If ever a problem cried out for a uniform and comprehensive 
solution, it is the geophysical problem described by the complaints . . . . [T]he scope 
of the worldwide predicament demands the most comprehensive view 
available . . . .”314 Similarly, the New York City court declared that “the immense and 
complicated problem of global warming requires a comprehensive solution . . . .”315 
While the courts have not expressly stated it this way, the worry seems to be that 
state common law actions, and even federal common law actions, should be 
dismissed because of their limited purchase on the climate change problem. 
Undoubtedly, a comprehensive solution to climate change would be preferable 
to a piecemeal approach. However, because GHGs are emitted globally by a myriad 
of sources, no single set of institutions—whether the courts, Congress, or the 
executive branch—is capable of generating anything close to a comprehensive 
 
313. See Nicolas Terry, From Health Policy to Stigma and Back Again: The Feedback Loop 
Perpetuating the Opioids Crisis, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 785, 805–08 (2019). 
314. BP III, No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated sub nom. 
BP II, 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020). 
315. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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solution.316 Granted, the political branches might produce a broader approach to 
climate change than the courts. Courts are necessarily constrained by the cases 
brought before them, whereas Congress and federal agencies can generate more 
comprehensive policies through legislation or rulemaking. Courts are at a 
comparative institutional disadvantage, but it does not necessarily follow that they 
should refrain from adjudicating climate change public nuisance cases. In the 
absence of a directive from Congress—in the form of displacement, preemption, 
or otherwise—courts have the authority and indeed, the duty, to decide  
these claims. 
International institutions offer no more favorable prospects for a 
comprehensive solution to climate change. As a general matter, international 
environmental law is of limited effectiveness, a “thirty-percent solution” whose 
primary force is in encouraging and enabling international cooperation.317 
International law has proven especially limited in addressing climate change. 
Notwithstanding nearly three decades of international attention to the growing 
climate threat, GHG emissions continue to rise, and achieving the global 
community’s goal of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system appears unlikely.318 
Worries that adjudication cannot comprehensively solve climate change hint 
at plaintiffs’ potential difficulties in overcoming the problem of diluteness. Namely, 
the defendants in climate change public nuisance cases can assert that any emissions 
that might be attributed to them represent a small percentage of cumulative GHG 
emissions worldwide. They might further contend that their fair share is an even 
smaller percentage because their customers—a sizable share of the global 
population—directly engaged in or benefited from the activities that generated the 
emissions.319 Such causation-related arguments may ultimately prevail, but they are 
arguments on the merits that courts should address as such. That plaintiffs might 
struggle to establish causation should not excuse courts from adjudicating the merits 
in the first instance.  
Courts also might hesitate to decide the climate change public nuisance cases 
on the merits because doing so would require them to balance competing interests, 
a task better suited for policymakers. Relatedly, should plaintiffs prevail, crafting a 
remedy would involve courts in an exercise that courts may view as analogous to 
legislating. The Oakland court, for example, suggested that the “question of 
reasonableness . . . falls squarely within the type of balancing best left to Congress 
 
316. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 160, at 353 (holding out climate change as an example of a 
“wickedly complex” problem that does not “yield to straightforward command-and-control regulation 
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LAW 15–16 (2010). 
318. See Noah M. Sachs, The Paris Agreement in the 2020s: Breakdown or Breakup?, 46 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 867–70, 888–89 (2019).  
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(or diplomacy).”320 Similarly, the AEP district court reasoned that adjudicating 
public nuisance would require a balancing of interests that “is impossible without 
an initial policy determination . . . by the elected branches.”321  
Judicial anxiety that deciding the substance of climate change public nuisance 
claims would lead courts to overstep their proper constitutional role is unwarranted. 
Common law claims lie at the core of courts’ competence and authority. Their 
adjudication on the merits, regardless of their difficulty or outcomes, does not give 
rise to problems of democratic accountability.322 As Kysar and Ewing  
have observed: 
There is no obvious reason why preliminary filters are necessary or 
desirable as an additional gatekeeper against unmanageable, would-be 
common law claims, above and beyond the quite significant power of 
courts to dismiss for legal insufficiency within the common law framework 
itself. The widespread failure of public nuisance claims in the handgun, 
lead paint, and subprime mortgage industry contexts suggests that courts 
have means readily available to manage nuisance doctrine from within.323  
Moreover, the legislative branch’s ability to override any judicial outcome it 
deems objectionable only underscores the absence of  
separation-of-powers concerns. 
Contrary to such concerns, Katy Kuh has suggested that judicial engagement 
with climate change public nuisance cases “would strengthen democracy in accord 
with widely accepted justifications for countermajoritarian judicial review.”324 First, 
Kuh contends, courts’ fundamental duty to protect representation in the political 
process requires consideration of the interests of children and future generations, 
who, like politically disadvantaged minorities, are systematically disadvantaged in 
political processes.325 While existing doctrine does not recognize children or future 
generations as suspect classifications meriting constitutionally heightened review,326 
courts’ substantive adjudication of climate change public nuisance claims—which 
are based on common law rather than the Constitution—would not require such 
recognition. Rather than overriding democratically determined policy, adjudication 
of these claims can reinforce democratic principles of participation and 
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rev’d, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
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representation.327 Admittedly, the representation of future generations, though 
consistent with the principle of intergenerational equity, extends beyond 
conventional understandings of representative democracy. However, children are 
indeed poorly represented in the political process, especially in circumstances where 
the presumption that adults act in the best interest of their children may not  
hold true.328 
Kuh further asserts that judicial review can advance democratic values by 
correcting pathologies in the political process.329 This second argument for judicial 
review highlights the fact that misinformation can distort not only the economic 
marketplace but also the political marketplace. California public nuisance doctrine 
already recognizes that distortion of the economic marketplace—specifically, 
promotion of a product “with knowledge of the hazard that [its] use would 
create”—can give rise to a public nuisance.330 For public nuisance purposes, it is 
likely too much of a stretch to analogize the harms to the democratic process caused 
by such conduct to the physical harms of climate change. But climate change public 
nuisance plaintiffs need not make such an argument in order to succeed. As courts 
consider the substance of plaintiffs’ claims, their attention to defendants’ efforts to 
distort public communication and the political process can weed out unscientific 
claims, help to set the record straight, and facilitate informed democratic debate on 
future climate policy.331  
CONCLUSION 
Shrinking from their obligation to decide the cases brought before them, 
district courts have dodged the substantive merits of the climate change public 
nuisance cases by stretching and misapplying avoidance doctrines. Courts’ 
treatment of the climate change cases stands in sharp contrast to public interest 
public nuisance cases involving other subjects, where courts have demonstrated the 
ability to engage with the substance of public nuisance in complex settings. The 
dodging of climate change public nuisance cases is poorly reasoned and 
unwarranted; simply put, courts can and should decide whether defendants’ 
production, promotion, and sale of fossil fuels constitutes a public nuisance. 
If courts do reach the substantive merits, plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims 
against fossil fuel companies ultimately may not succeed. The existence of 
attenuated causal chains, countless GHG emitters, and protracted timeframes 
surrounding the emission of GHGs and the incurrence of harm all pose formidable 
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barriers to plaintiffs. Furthermore, making climate change policy through litigation 
would be far from ideal. Climate change public nuisance plaintiffs nevertheless 
should have an opportunity to make their case. Successful actions could bring 
industry to the table and facilitate the crafting of legislated approaches. Even 
unsuccessful action can call attention to fossil fuel companies’ responsibility for 
climate change—including any involvement in disinformation campaigns—and 
mobilize public support for concrete and effective responses.332 
 
332. See Lin & Burger, supra note 130, at 93. 
